THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY 39icy issues (Walker 1941), 1 the CAC can be categorized as a policy discussiongroup for the Chicago business community. In its initial report, completed in1910, the Association concluded that “electrification” of the railroad lines inthe Chicago area “should be no great difficulty” and that it could be successfullyaccomplished “within a reasonable time.” The CAC report went on toassert that electrification of the city’s railroads “is not only practicable, butwill be of great advantage to Chicago, and it is recommended for [immediate]execution” (Chicago Association of Commerce 1915, 20).The Chicago Association of Commerce, however, did not initially publishits findings. Instead, it presented them to numerous railroad executivesto seek their support (Stradling and Tarr 1999, 694–696). This nonconfrontationaltack taken by the CAC is to be expected. Because whileChicago’s local business community had an interest in controlling smoke, itsfortunes were simply too dependent on the railroad firms for its members totake a politically antagonistic attitude toward them.Allan Pred (1966), in his comprehensive analysis of the rise of the U.S.city-system during the nineteenth century, makes special note of the importanceof the railroad to this system and its expansion, and how Chicagoassumed an important place within the U.S. city-system during this periodprecisely because numerous railroad lines were placed there. Pred explainsthat “the paramount importance of initial rail and terminal facility advantagesto urban-industrial growth is best exemplified by Chicago.” He thengoes on to describe in detail how the growth of Chicago during the latter halfof the nineteenth century can be directly attributed to the railroad:In 1860 Chicago was a city of moderate size, with less than 5,400 workersemployed in printing, carpentering and cabinetmaking, boot and shoe production,baking, coopering, tailoring, brickmaking, and other small-scaleindustries that catered primarily to local markets. Even the city’s 16foundries and machine shops, with almost 600 laborers, were occupiedlargely with fulfilling special local orders; and not one manufacturing establishmentin the young metropolis had a working force in excess of 200.Within fifty years industrial employment in the physically expandedmetropolis had grown to more than 325,000, many of them in the categorieswhose firms frequently served distant markets (e.g., the machinery andfoundry product industry had 41,492 employees; the slaughtering and meatpacking industry had 27,083; and the iron and steel industry, 16,730employees). Chicago’s phenomenal rise was foreshown by 1860, when thecity had emerged as the nation’s most important railroad center, a terminusfor 11 trunk roads and 20 branch and feeder lines. (54)Between 1870 and 1890, “the mileage of railroads entering Chicago hadincreased 370 percent; their tonnage 490 percent” (Hoyt 1933, 142). Additionally,as one student of Chicago’s economic growth notes, “There was a
40THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONrush of manufacturing concerns to locate in the Chicago area to obtain theadvantage of its superior terminal facilities and favorable railroad rates”(Hoyt 1933, 143). Thus, between 1884 and 1890, the value of manufacturedproducts increased during this period from $292 million to $664 million(Hoyt 1933, 144).The significant railroad investment placed in Chicago and its subsequenteconomic growth are not only attributable to its location adjacent to LakeMichigan and position in relation to New York City. In addition to these factors,Chicago was a good place for capital investment during the middle andlate nineteenth century because local actors created the physical and politicalmilieu conducive for such investment.With the clearing out of the Native American population, and cheapcredit, Chicago during the 1830s became part of the broader effort to profitfrom the expected colonization of the Old Northwest territory. Cronon(1991) explains thatthe mid-1830s saw the most intense land speculation in American history,with Chicago at the center of the vortex. Believing Chicago was about tobecome the terminus of a major canal, land agents and speculators floodedinto town, buying and selling not only the empty lots along its ill-markedstreets but also the surrounding grasslands which the Indians had recentlyabandoned. (29)Therefore, once the Indian population was moved out, thereby opening theOld Northwest territory to be integrated into the U.S. and Europeaneconomies, inhabitants and investors in significant numbers came to theChicago area to economically benefit from an anticipated land boom. Theviews of this class of Chicago residents and investors came to dominate thecity’s politics (Belcher 1947; Keating 1988).This pro-growth political outlook led to various projects designed toattract capital investment to the area. It, for example, facilitated the buildingof a canal in the 1840s that connected Lake Michigan to the MississippiRiver watershed, thereby making the Chicago area an important NorthAmerican transport point (Belcher 1947, 34–35; Cronon 1991, 32–33).Moreover, in the late 1840s, it was leading members of Chicago’s real estateinterests that built the first railroad line running to Chicago (Belcher 1947,125–131; Cronon 1991, 65–67). In the 1850s, Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas,who himself held substantial tracts of land in the area (Belcher 1947,125–126), successfully lobbied to have the first federal railroad land grant runto Chicago (Cronon 1991, 68–70).This congenial attitude toward investment and economic growth inChicago paid off well for those that owned substantial amounts of land in thearea. Between the years 1833 and 1910, land value within the incorporatedarea of Chicago had grown from $168,000 to $1.5 billion. By 1926, the eve
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SIXDemocratic Ethics,Environmental
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BibliographyAcher, Robin. 2001. “
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 119Brienes, Marvin. 19
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 121Cole, Luke W., and
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 123——— . 2002. W
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 127Hayward, Clarissa R
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 133Perez-Pena, Richard
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 135Runte, Alfred. 1997
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 137Tarr, Joel A. 1996.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 139Wiewel, Wim, and Jo
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