THE RISE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 53had a relatively small population. Hence, he obtained large tracts of land relativelyinexpensively, but these tracts were also widely dispersed throughoutthe region. Spencer Crump (1988), historian of Huntington’s interurban trolleysystem, the Pacific Electric, in the following describes how Huntingtonwould select where to run his trolley lines and acquire his land holdings:Huntington’s instinctive business foresight, not a battery of professionaleconomists frequently used by financial tycoons, was his instruments inchoosing the areas where his trolleys—and his investments in substantialland holdings—would go. Climbing a knoll, he would inspect the countrysideand visualize the logical course for an area’s pattern of development.(60)Utilizing this method, Huntington obtained scattered land holdings throughoutsouthern California. He also deployed a far-flung trolley system that onehistorian of urban mass transit referred to as “the most extensive interurban[trolley] system in the world” (Foster 1981, 17). This system would disperseeconomic activity and residential housing throughout the region. This dispersalof development would presage the highly diffuse urban developmentthat would characterize the Los Angeles region throughout the twentiethcentury and into the contemporary era (Fogelson 1967; Wachs 1984; Hise1997; Fulton 2001). Crump (1988) argues that when the Los Angeles trolleycars “finally rolled into the realm of history [in 1961], they left a sprawlingCity of Southern California built precisely as it was because the rail lines hadencouraged just that development” (115–116).The utilization of rapid transit to enhance land values and create urbansprawl was not unique to Los Angeles. The positive relationship betweenland values and rapid transportation had long been understood (Jackson1985; Stilgoe 1988). During most of the nineteenth century, however, walkingremained the primary means of getting around in urban settings, and as aresult cities were relatively compact and often highly congested (Rosen 1986;Schultz 1989).Early rapid transportation methods were of limited utility. Carriages andomnibuses were reliant on horse power, which severely limited their speed.Moreover, the costs of such modes of transportation restricted their use toaffluent city dwellers. The first methods of mechanized urban transportationhad limited utility for economic and/or political reasons. The use of steamengines within urban areas was resisted in part because residents feared theirexplosion. Additionally, the noise and air pollution emitted by such enginestended to depress the value of adjacent property. Also, their long stoppingdistance, or headway, undermined their usefulness for urban transport. Theother early approach to the mechanization of urban transportation was thecable car. Its high initial and maintenance costs, however, confined its use toonly the most densely populated areas (McShane 1994).
54THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONThe trolley did not have the liabilities that did horses, steam engines, orcable cars. Trolleys could move at fairly rapid speeds. Given initial costs andmaintenance expenses, trolley systems were relatively inexpensive to run.Trolley cars were also clean and largely noiseless. Thus, soon after their successfuldemonstration in Richmond, Virginia, in 1887, trolley cars were usedin numerous urban areas throughout North America, including New York,Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Toronto, and Milwaukee (McShane 1974;1994; Warner 1978; Davis 1979; Cheape 1980; Foster 1981; Barrett 1983;Fogelson 2001, chap. 2).Trolley lines throughout North America, like in Los Angeles, were usedto increase the value of outlying land. Indeed, the first trolley system in amajor metropolitan area was actually developed as part of a massive landdevelopment plan (Cheape 1980, 115). Led by Henry M. Whitney, theinvestors of the West End Land Company sought to develop five millionsquare feet of land on Boston’s outskirts. The trolley was the only means tomake this subdivided land available to the buyers the company hoped toattract. In order to connect its land holdings with the rest of the city, theinvestors of the West End Land Company were forced through their subsidiary,the West End Street Railway, to take over the franchises of other transitlines, and subsequently integrated them into a citywide trolley system inthe mid-1890s. Historian Charles Cheape (1980) notes with some irony thatin Boston “what had begun as an adjunct to a real estate venture became amajor transit enterprise” (115). More generally, Mark S. Foster (1981), a historianof rapid transit in North America, notes that “in the late nineteenthcentury, real estate interests and trolley promoters combined to develop hugeareas of Brooklyn, Boston, Chicago, and many other large cities” (17).Apart from the economic self-interest of trolley owners, another factorprecipitating sprawl in urban North America during the turn of the centurywas political pressure. Clay McShane (1974), for instance, points out thatthe effort to regulate trolley transportation in Milwaukee ended in the early1890s when the Milwaukee Street Railway Company agreed to expand intooutlying areas (87). In Chicago, a 1907 ordinance mandated numerous“cornfield extensions.” They were referred to as such because trolley lineswere literally extended into areas made up largely of cornfields (Barrett1983, 114–115). The Toronto trolley system was taken over in 1921 by localgovernment after the trolley company refused to expand into the city’s outskirts(Davis 1979; Weaver 1984). The Detroit railway company was takenover by the city government under the same circumstances (Conot 1986,186 and 612).One constant source of pressure for trolley expansion was large landowners and developers. 1 Real estate interests would expend considerableenergies lobbying for the extension of trolley lines—sometimes donating landand subsidizing the costs of trolley line construction in order to obtain lines
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 137Tarr, Joel A. 1996.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 139Wiewel, Wim, and Jo
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144THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONTuc