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GEORGE A. GONZALEZ - fieldi

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56THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONfirms in North America. John McKay (1976; 1988) has written the definitivehistory on the adoption of the trolley in Europe. Unlike the North Americancase, in Europe trolley lines were generally laid in an economically efficientand geographically effective manner. As a result, European trolley systems didnot have the economic and political liabilities that plagued U.S. and Canadiansystems.The political energy and economic resources for the adoption of the trolleyin Europe came largely from the manufacturers of trolley equipment. Thesemanufacturers had to overcome the political opposition that developedagainst the trolley throughout the continent based on aesthetic considerations.The overhead wires that trolley lines utilized led many to object to theuse of streetcars on main boulevards. These objections delayed the introductionof trolleys in most European cities for a number of years when comparedwith the United States and Canada. With the manufacturers of trolley equipmentserving as the key impetus underlying the creation of trolley systems, inEurope trolley firms sought to derive a profit from the operation of their lines.Profitable trolley lines could regularly maintain and upgrade their equipment.As outlined above, this is in sharp contrast to the experience of North Americancities, where in many important instances trolley systems were created bylarge land holders and used not necessarily to make a profit from the trolleysthemselves but instead from the real estate trolley lines served.Additionally, in Europe, trolley politics was significantly different thanin North America. European governments exerted influence over trolleyfirms that tended to promote effective and affordable service for patrons.McKay (1976) explains that “it is obvious from the agreements [with trolleyfirms] that [European] municipalities succeeded in winning substantialimprovements in all areas, which went well beyond those inherent in theinnovation [of the streetcar], such as speedier, more comfortable, and morehygienic service” (112–113). In the United States, urban governments didnot generally regulate the quality of service that consumers received (Foster1981; Barrett 1983; Bottles 1987). In describing the divergence between theEuropean and U.S. experience with early rapid transit, McKay (1976) makesthe point that “a distinguishing characteristic of American tramway developmentfrom the beginning was the absence of effective public control” (91).In seeking an explanation for this divergence, McKay posits that “weshould ... note the greater possibilities for the corruption of municipal officialsin the United States than in Europe” (94).With trolley firms seeking profit largely through the operation of theirlines, and a political environment that prioritized efficient and effective transportation,streetcar systems in Europe expanded much more conservativelythan was generally the case in North America. McKay (1976) argues that European“suburban expansion was facilitated by electric streetcars, which promoteda reasonable diffusion of population without, however, blowing the city

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