THE RISE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 61One factor that prompted the sprawl of urban development in many U.S.urban areas was the positive opinion that local businesspeople had of horizontalgrowth. Barrett (1983) documents how in Chicago the business communitygenerally supported the use of the automobile and the outward expansionit brought. 4 Additionally, Blaine A. Brownell (1975), who studied urban publicopinion in the South between 1920 and 1930 by examining major newspapersin the region, points out that Southern “businessmen lauded the automobilebecause it promised to open up new channels of commerce, expand thepool of customers for downtown merchants, and make available large expansesof outlying territory for urban growth and economic development.” He adds:The major issue concerning businessmen in major southern cities during the1920s was not whether the automobile was desirable, but whether roads,highways, and related facilities could be provided rapidly enough to insurethe maximum degree of economic advantage. The Good Roads Movementin the South, and throughout the country, had always received the supportof prominent business groups, and in the 1920s most chambers of commercein the larger cities established committees especially charged with the taskof promoting highway construction and the repair of existing roads. (117)Howard Preston (1991), who wrote a history on the development of roads inthe South during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, adds that“by 1915 the legions of good roads apostles in the South were swollen withchamber of commerce members, bank presidents, sales representatives, realestate agents, and trade board members” (41).In addition to local support for the automobile and suburban development,beginning in the 1920s, the federal government politically supportedhorizontal urban growth. Adam Rome (2001), in his book linking the rise ofmodern environmentalism in the United States to urban sprawl, holds thatthe federal government during this period fostered low density housing developmentto attain broad-based home ownership (chap. 1; also see Radford1996). In accounting for this support of sprawl, Weiss (1987) explains thatwith the accession of Herbert Hoover as secretary of commerce in 1921,NAREB became an important and highly favored trade association workingclosely with the Commerce Department’s new Division of Building and Housing,as well as with other federal agencies. By the early 1930s NAREB was amajor presence at the U.S. President’s Conference on Home Building andHome Ownership in 1931 and a key national lobbying force behind the creationof the Federal Home Loan Banking System, the Federal Housing Administration,and a number of additional federal policies and programs. (29)The most significant program undertaken by the federal government to promotehome ownership came through the Federal Housing Authority (FHA)(the unofficial name of the Federal Housing Administration). Created in 1934,
62THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONFHA’s staff was recruited almost entirely from the private sector. Many werecorporate executives from a variety of different fields, but real estate andfinancial backgrounds predominated. For example, Ayers DuBois, who hadbeen a state director of the California Real Estate Association, was an assistantdirector of FHA’s Underwriting Division. Fred Marlow, a well-knownLos Angeles subdivider, headed FHA’s southern California district office,which led the nation in insuring home mortgages. National figures associatedwith NAREB, such as real estate economist Ernest Fisher and appraiserFrederick Babcock, directed FHA operations in economics and in underwriting.(Weiss 1987, 146)As a way to encourage housing sales, the FHA underwrote home purchases.It would guarantee 80 percent of home mortgages for qualifiedhomes and buyers for a twenty-year term. (Later, this guarantee was modifiedto 90 percent and twenty-five years.) Up to this time, standard mortgagescovered 50 percent of the home purchase price and had a three-yearterm (Weiss 1987, 146).This program gave the FHA the ability to influence the types of homespurchased and, subsequently, housing development patterns. Weiss notes:Because FHA could refuse to insure mortgages on properties due to theirlocation in neighborhoods that were too poorly planned or unprotected andtherefore too “high-risk,” it definitely behooved most reputable subdividersto conform to FHA standards. This put FHA officials in the enviable position,far more than any regulatory planning agency, of being able to tell subdividershow to develop their land. (148)With this power, the FHA promoted the building of large-scale housingdevelopments in outlying areas. Weiss (1987) explains that the FederalHousing “Administration’s clear preference ... was to use conditionalcommitments [for loan guarantees] specifically to encourage large-scaleproducers of complete new residential subdivisions, or ‘neighborhoodunits’.” Thus, the FHA, through its loan program, encouraged and subsidized“privately controlled and coordinated development of whole residentialcommunities of predominately single-family housing on the urbanperiphery” (147).Kenneth Jackson (1985), in his important history on the suburbanizationof urban development in the United States, concurs with Weiss’s assessmentof the bias within the FHA for new housing stock in outlying areas.Jackson (1985) writes that “in practice, FHA insurance went to new residentialdevelopments on the edges of metropolitan areas, to the neglect ofcore cities” (206). As a result, Jackson notes that between the years 1942and 1968 the “FHA had a vast influence on the suburbanization of theUnited States” (209).
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 135Runte, Alfred. 1997
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 137Tarr, Joel A. 1996.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 139Wiewel, Wim, and Jo
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144THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONTuc