LOCAL GROWTH COALITIONS 11ity tend to have stronger air pollution regulatory regimes, whereas lesswealthy and less economically active areas have weaker regimes.With the nation’s clean air regime fluctuating according to state andlocal concerns over economic growth and/or other locally or regionally generatedpolitical issues, what is the precise role of federal clean air policies? Ihave already noted one function of federal environmental laws and policies—legitimation.Again, it is Cahn (1995) who explicitly develops thisposition. As I alluded to above, it was in the face of the social movements ofthe late 1960s and early 1970s that the federal government passed its mostsweeping environmental legislation, and created its environmental regulatoryagency, the EPA (Rosenbaum 1998; Andrews 1999). In light of this context,it can be argued that this legislation and agency were created to demobilizethose who were protesting against corporate America’s treatment of the environment,thus bringing social and political peace to U.S. society (Ford 2001).Their creation communicated to this social movement that its environmentalconcerns were being addressed, and therefore protestors could end theirdisruptive activities and go back to resuming their normal lives.Despite the strong wording of this early legislation, however, the federalgovernment has not developed an aggressive environmental regulatoryregime. Specifically, throughout most of its history, the EPA has lackedappropriate funding levels and strong political backing (Mintz 1995; Lee1996; Weber 1998; Seelye 2002; 2003). Moreover, it relies largely on thestates for enforcement purposes.Cahn does not limit his critique to the relatively weak nature of the federalgovernment’s environmental regulatory regimes. He also points out thatdespite the rhetorical commitment of most federal elected officials to environmentalprotection, the federal government’s overriding and primary goalis the promotion of economic activity and growth. Such activity and growthis the chief cause of air, water, and waste pollution. The federal governmenthas also promoted and subsidized the use of highly polluting fossil fuels. Thefederal government’s subsidizing and encouragement of fossil fuel usage isreflected in its 1998 appropriation of $200 billion for the maintenance andexpansion of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, which “amounted tothe largest public-works program in the nation’s history.” Over 80 percent ofthese funds were dedicated to highway and bridge construction (Andrews1999, 303–304; also see Hulse 2004). Therefore, while federal officials (sinceat least the early 1970s) have been publicly committed to environmentalprotection, their substantive policies toward this end are relatively weak.Conversely, they have aggressively pursued policies that lead to environmentaldegradation.Apart from the legitimation and symbolic aspects of federal clean air policy,on certain air pollution issues, the federal government does provide uniformityand regulatory regime stability. This is most readily apparent in the
12THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONrealm of automobile and fuel emissions. The Federal Air Quality Act of 1967,for example, sought to establish one national automobile emission standardwhen states such as New York and California were setting their own standards(Krier and Ursin 1977, chap. 11). In addition, I (2001a, chap. 6)explain that the primary motive underlying the formulation of the FederalClean Air Act of 1990 was to stabilize the nation’s automobile and fuel emissionstandards.Specifically, I point out how in the mid- to late 1980s state and local-levelpolicies were threatening to create a multi-tiered system of regulations onautomobile and fuel emissions. In the area of automobile emissions, leadinginto 1989, the United States had a two-tier regulatory structure, with Californiahaving one standard and the federal government having its own weakerstandard. Within the span of a few months, this system was substantially complicated.Specifically, in the summer of 1989, New York, New Jersey, and theNew England states announced their intention to adopt the California emissionstandard. In September of that year, California announced its plan toestablish an even stronger set of standards than it currently had in place. Thiscreated the potential of a three-tier automobile emission standard system: (1)the existing federal standard; (2) the old California standard (adopted by NewYork, New Jersey, and New England); and (3) the newly announced Californiastandard. And while these actions involved only a handful of states, theycollectively composed about 20 to 30 percent of the U.S. automotive market.Additionally, these state-level actions created a potentially significantlegal and political dilemma. Up until this time, it had been both politicallyand legally accepted that states could either adopt the California automobileemission standard or the weaker federal standard. The possibility of a threetieremission system created the legal and political uncertainty about whetherstates could adopt an emission standard that varied from the three standardsthat were seemingly going to come into existence.Before the policy actions of these states took effect, thereby creating asignificant production and distribution—as well as a legal and political—problem for automobile manufacturers, the federal government stepped inwith the Clean Air Act of 1990. With this act, the federal governmentadopted the existing California automobile emission standard, and thus reinstateda two-tier automobile emission regulatory system. Moreover, erasingany legal ambiguity concerning the ability of states to establish their ownautomotive emission standards apart from those of the federal government’sor California’s, the Clean Air Act of 1990 contains a “no third vehicle”clause. Legal scholar John Ridge (1994) explains that this aspect of the Actprevents “the states from adopting new tailpipe emissions standards whichcause or have the effect of causing the [automobile] manufacturers to have tocreate a new vehicle or engine” apart from those prompted by the federal andCalifornia emission standards (176).
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SIXDemocratic Ethics,Environmental
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BibliographyAcher, Robin. 2001. “
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 119Brienes, Marvin. 19
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 121Cole, Luke W., and
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 123——— . 2002. W
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 125——— . 1975.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 127Hayward, Clarissa R
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 129——— . 2001. E
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 131——— . 1988.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 133Perez-Pena, Richard
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 135Runte, Alfred. 1997
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 137Tarr, Joel A. 1996.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 139Wiewel, Wim, and Jo
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