This section is classified as non-objective researchthis year's funding needs. This means there is aremaining EUR 26bn of issuance until year-end(excluding buybacks for the last four months of theyear for which we have no data yet). With threeauctions remaining (one in October and two inNovember) and one optional auction in December,France can issue an average of EUR 8.7bn perauction and skip the December one. Once weinclude the buybacks to the gross issuance figure weget that France has completed almost 87% of its2011 funding, which is slightly above the 84%eurozone average (Chart 1).For next year the supply picture improves furtherrelative to 2011. We expect gross issuance of Frenchbonds of around EUR 179bn from EUR 184bn in2011. In net issuance terms we expect a fall fromEUR 89bn in 2011 to EUR 80bn in 2012. Frenchbond redemptions are expected to be aroundEUR 99bn in 2012, while the projected deficitestimate is EUR 82bn according to AFT.From a less constructive point of view, the commonstylised fact of this euro crisis is a simultaneousweakness in domestic equity and government bondmarkets, followed by a significant increase involatility, absence of domestic buyers and theeventual ECB decision to purchase bonds (Chart 2).We’ve seen this happening in relatively small as wellas very large markets and economies (e.g. Italy).Pockets of weakness in the architecture of the euroas well as the absence of proactive decisions fromeurozone officials are the main reason for bondmarkets’ underperformance. The dangerous conceptof “Who’s Next?” has crept into investors’ mind.Contagion statsIn terms of total return (iBoxx Sovereign), France isdown 2.8% in October with only Belgium (-4.5%) andIreland (-3.2%) doing worse. Year-to-date, theperformance is around +3%, which puts it at the lowend of the AAA distribution (Germany +6.8%).In terms of price action, we’ve performed acorrelation analysis (Chart 3). Yield correlation toBunds is still around 80%, while spreads remain verycorrelated (e.g. BTP/Bund and OAT/Bund). Onenegative aspect is the increased correlation between10Y BTP yield and OAT (now into positive around20% from as low as -70% before the ECB reactivatedthe SMP). From this analysis, we concludethat contagion risk has recently increased in the AAAsector excluding Germany.Demand stabilisation neededFrom a broader EMU perspective, 10Y Italy is tradingaround 5.90% (Sep-21), i.e. just 20/25bp below thetop despite an estimate 55/60bn purchased by theECB. <strong>Market</strong> confidence in stabilising forces is quitelow at this stage.706050403020ASWChart 4: EFSF vs EUEU Jun-21EFSF Jul-2110Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11Source: <strong>BNP</strong> ParibasChart 5: Global Demand for EGB at Risk0.20.1Basis points0.0-0.1-0.2-0.3EMU3 vs EMU ALL index yield-0.4-0.52007 2008 2009 2010 201114%12%10%8%6%4%2%Daily iBoxx price returnvolatility (63 days)FranceGermanyItaly2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas400000300000200000100000-100000Chart 6: Excess liquidity and Eonia/Refi0-2000002005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Source: <strong>BNP</strong> ParibasEUR mlnExcess cashSpread ECB/Eonia (RHS)ECB/Eonia (21D avg)In that context, price dynamics of EFSF bonds (Jul-21 @62 z-spread and Bund Jul-21 +120bp, seeChart 4) is worrying as the street is questioning notonly investors' appetite for 440bn of EFSF bonds, butalso the impact that further weakness in OAT andBTP will have on the EFSF's AAA rating (the CDOargument has been already officially denied by Mr.Regling himself in a letter to the FT dated 28February 2011 entitled “No grounds to compare theEFSF with a CDO”).-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.6Alessandro Tentori / Ioannis Sokos / Camille de Courcel 20 October 2011<strong>Market</strong> Mover28www.Global<strong>Market</strong>s.bnpparibas.com
This section is classified as non-objective researchWe’ve mentioned the lack of confidence in eurozonestabilisation mechanisms. The recent discussion hasfocused mainly on the role of the EFSF and possibleways to leverage its intervention power. Why?Because the demand component of the EURgovernment bond pricing equation is becomingincreasingly significant now that we’ve had contagioninto Italy and the risk of further contagion into AAAhas increased.One way to analyse global demand trends is toreplicate the performance of customised portfolios vsglobal benchmarks. According to our investorintelligence, global EUR investors (especially centralbanks) have shifted from a EMU all-index tocustomised benchmarks (e.g. EMU3) in 2010, on theback of the severe underperformance in peripherycountries.In this context, Germany has been used as a proxyfor AAA EUR rates, France has been used as AAAwith some additional yield pick-up and Italy has beenused as a liquid, low volatility proxy for non-coreEMU. The performance of this custom benchmarksince July 2011 is impressively poor (Chart 5). At thesame time, volatility in Italy has picked upsignificantly, thus reducing its once excellent Sharperatio. Similarly, increased volatility is likely to limit theappetite even for AAA sovereign paper. Volatility hasrecently increased also in France and Germany.We’re looking for EUR 230bn of net supply fromeurozone governments in 2012, which is some 60bnless than our estimate of long-term trend demand.However, the benchmark argument exposed aboveis likely to further limit global demand and create theneed for external stabilisation (i.e. ECB).ECB to the rescue?We feel compelled to add to this discussion from thestandpoint of pure monetary policy. Using the ECBas a leveraging vehicle for EFSF operationsdemands several questions:1) Assume full EFSF lending capacity is needed,then the amount of outstanding OMO would jump toaround 880/890bn from current 480bn (assuming7.5% haircut on Liquidity 2 collateral with maturity>10Y).2) Even if the full amount is not needed at once, theEFSF's size is such that Eonia fixings would sufferfrom augmented volatility around open market ops.The money market is already a stressed market andadding further pricing uncertainty conflicts with theidea of smoothly functioning markets.3) Since EFSF funding is needed on a long-termbasis, we should expect significant excess liquidityconditions to prevail long-term. The ECB hasrepeatedly stressed that unconventional policymeasures are only "of temporary nature".4) A more or less permanent level of excess liquidityin the system has a permanent bias on theEonia/Refi spread (Eonia fixing closer to the depositfacility rather than to the policy rate, see Chart 6).Again, the ECB has repeatedly made clear that thismoney market distortion is not satisfying.5) Providing funds against EFSF collateral (directly)has limited impact on the transmission mechanismand the ability of the eurosystem to financeproductive businesses, as the EFSF would not belending to corporates directly.6) As described in 6.4.1. ("General risk controlprinciples"), the eurosystem may exclude specificcounterparties from monetary policy operations, "inparticular if the credit quality of the counterpartyappears to exhibit a high correlation with the creditquality of the collateral submitted by thecounterparty". The practice of cross-issuing eligiblecollateral has been criticised by the ECB. Thepractice of issuing 92% of currently outstanding OMOand shipping it into the ECB is highly questionable,especially if the collateral is 100% correlated with thecounterparty's credit risk.From a pure monetary policy perspective, buyinggovernment (and corporate) bonds directly is a betteroption for the ECB than adding a new layer betweendebtors and creditors. It would improve banks'balance sheet and sovereigns' primary financingability, while at the same time increasing the chanceof transmission to the productive private sector.Furthermore, increasing the SMP's size would alsoimprove market's confidence in the product (in thiscase the EUR government bond). But again, thereare several issues around a full scale QEprogramme, e.g. sterilisation, price stability, balancesheet guarantee, and so on. We’re not saying thatleveraging the EFSF via ECB cannot be done intheory; rather it is just not an optimal choice in thecontext of ECB's loss function.Alessandro Tentori / Ioannis Sokos / Camille de Courcel 20 October 2011<strong>Market</strong> Mover29www.Global<strong>Market</strong>s.bnpparibas.com