190 Political-economic capitalist transformationmany share the sense that we are at some kind <strong>of</strong> 'second industrialdivide' (to appropriate the title <strong>of</strong> Piore and Sabel's book), and thatnew forms <strong>of</strong> labour organization and new locational principles areradically transforming the face <strong>of</strong> late twenti .eth-cent u. ry capitalis n: .<strong>The</strong> revival <strong>of</strong> interest in the role <strong>of</strong> small busIlless (a hIghly dynamIcsector since 1970), the rediscovery <strong>of</strong> sweatshops and <strong>of</strong> informalactivities <strong>of</strong> all kinds, and the recognition that these are playing animportant role in contemporary economic development even in themost advanced <strong>of</strong> industrialized countries, and the attempt to trackthe rapid geographical shifts in employment and economic fortune ,have produced a mass <strong>of</strong> information that seems to support thIsvision <strong>of</strong> a major transformation in the way late twentieth-centurycapitalism is working. A vast literature has indeed emerged, frmboth left and right ends <strong>of</strong> the political spectrum, that tends to depIctthe world as if it is in the full flood <strong>of</strong> such a radical break in allthese dimensions <strong>of</strong> socio-economic and political life that none <strong>of</strong>the old ways <strong>of</strong> thinking and doing apply any more.<strong>The</strong> second position sees the idea <strong>of</strong> flexibility as an 'extremelypowerful term which legitimizes an array <strong>of</strong> political practices' (ciflyreactionary and anti-worker), but without any str mg .empmcalor materialist grounding in the actual facts <strong>of</strong> orgamzatIon <strong>of</strong> latetwentieth-century capitalism. Pollert (1988), for example, factuallychallenges the idea <strong>of</strong> flexibility in labour markets and labour organization,and concludes that the 'discovery <strong>of</strong> the "flexible workforce"is part <strong>of</strong> an ideological <strong>of</strong>fensive which celebrates pliability andcasualization, and makes them seem inevitable.' Gordon (1988)similarly challenges the idea <strong>of</strong> hyper- eograpical mobility fcapital as far beyond what the facts <strong>of</strong> IllternatlOnal trade (particularlybetween the advanced capitalist countries and the less developedcountries) will support. Gordon is particularly conc rned tocombat the idea <strong>of</strong> the supposed powerlessness <strong>of</strong> the nation state(and <strong>of</strong> worker movements operating within that framework) toexercise any degree <strong>of</strong> control over capital mobility. Sayer 198)likewise disputes the accounts <strong>of</strong> the new forms <strong>of</strong> accumulation IIInew industrial spaces as put forward by Scott (1988) and others onthe grounds that they emphasize relatively insignificant and peipheralchanges. Pollert, Gordon and Sa < er all argue .th .a there ISnothing new in the capitalist search for Illcresed flexlblhty or .locationaladvantage, and that the substantive eVIdence for any radIcalchange in the way capitalism is working is either weak or fa lty.Those who promote the idea <strong>of</strong> flexibility, they suggest, are eItherconsciously or inadvertently contributing to a climate <strong>of</strong> opinionan ideological condition - that renders working-class movementsless rather than more powerful.!1IFlexible accumulation 191I do not accept this position. <strong>The</strong> evidence for increased flexibility(sub-contracting, temporary and self-employment, etc.) throughoutthe capitalist world is simply too overwhelming to make Pollert'scounter-examples credible. I also find it surprising that Gordon, whoearlier made a reasonably strong case that the suburbanization <strong>of</strong>industry away from the city centres was in part motivated by adesire to increase labour control, should reduce the question <strong>of</strong>geographical mobility to a matter <strong>of</strong> volumes and directions <strong>of</strong> internationaltrade. Nevertheless, such criticisms introduce a number <strong>of</strong>important correctives in the debate. <strong>The</strong> insistence that there isnothing essentially new in the push towards flexibility, and thatcapitalism has periodically taken these sorts <strong>of</strong> paths before, is certainlycorrect (a careful reading <strong>of</strong> Marx's Capital sustains the point).he .argument that there is an acute danger <strong>of</strong> exaggerating thesIgmficance <strong>of</strong> any trend towards increased flexibility and geographicalmobility, ?linding us to how strongly implanted Fordist productionsystems Ill are, deserves careful consideration. And the ideologicaland pohtIcal consequences <strong>of</strong> overemphasizing flexibility in thenarrow sense <strong>of</strong> production technique and labour relations are seriouseno t make .sober and careful evaluations <strong>of</strong> the degree <strong>of</strong>fleXIbIlIty Imperative. If, after all, workers are convinced that capitalistscan move or shift to more flexible work practices even whenthey cannot, then the stomach for struggle will surely be weakened.But I think it equally dangerous to pretend that nothing has changed,when the facts <strong>of</strong> de industrialization and <strong>of</strong> plant relocation, <strong>of</strong> moreflexible manning practices and labour markets, <strong>of</strong> automation andproduct innovation, stare most workers in the face.<strong>The</strong> third position, which defines the sense in which I use the idea<strong>of</strong> a transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation here, liessomewhere in between these two extremes. Flexible technologies andorganizational forms have not become hegemonic everywhere (butthen neither did the Fordism that preceded them). <strong>The</strong> current conjunctureis characterized by a mix <strong>of</strong> highly efficient Fordist production(<strong>of</strong>ten nuanced by flexible technology and output) in some sectorsand regions (like cars in the USA, Japan, or South Korea) and moretraditional production systems (such as those <strong>of</strong> Singapore, Taiwan,or Hong Kong) resting on 'artisanal,' paternalistic, or patriarchal(familial) labour relations, embodying quite different mechanisms<strong>of</strong> labour control. <strong>The</strong> latter systems have undoubtedly grown(even within the advanced capitalist countries) since 1970, <strong>of</strong>ten atthe expense <strong>of</strong> the Fordist factory assembly line. This shift hasimportant implications. Market coordinations (<strong>of</strong>ten <strong>of</strong> the subcontractingsort) have expanded at the expense <strong>of</strong> direct corporateplanning within the system <strong>of</strong> surplus value production and appro-
192 Political-economic capitalist transformationpriation. <strong>The</strong> nature and composition <strong>of</strong> the global working class hasalso changed, as have the conditions <strong>of</strong> consciousness formation andpolitical action. Unionization and traditional 'left politics' becomevery hard to sustain in the face, for example, <strong>of</strong> the patriarchal(family) production systems characteristic <strong>of</strong> South-East Asia, or <strong>of</strong>immigrant groups in Los Angeles, New York, and London. Genderrelations have similarly become much more complicated, at the sametime as resort to a female labour force has become much morewidespread. By the same token, the social basis for ideologies <strong>of</strong>entrepreneurial ism, paternalism, and privatism has increased. .We can, I think, trace back many <strong>of</strong> the surface shifts in economicbehaviour and political attitudes to a simple change in balance betweenFordist and non-Fordist systems <strong>of</strong> labour control, coupled with adisciplining <strong>of</strong> the former either through competition with the latter(forced restructrings and rationalizations), widespread unemploymentor through political repression (curbs on union power) andgeographical relocations to 'peripheral' countries or regions andback into industrial heartlands in a 'see-saw' motion <strong>of</strong> uneven geographicaldevelopment (Smith, 1984).I do not see this shift to alternative systems <strong>of</strong> labour control(with all its political implications) as irreversible, but interpret it as arather traditional response to crisis. <strong>The</strong> devaluation <strong>of</strong> labour powerhas always been the instinctive response <strong>of</strong> capitalists to fallingpr<strong>of</strong>its. <strong>The</strong> generality <strong>of</strong> that conceals, however, some contradictorymovements. New technologies have empowered certain privilegedlayers, at the same time as alternative production and labour controlsystems open up the way to high remuneration <strong>of</strong> technical, managerial,and entrepreneurial skills. <strong>The</strong> trend, further exaggerated bythe shift to services and the enlargement <strong>of</strong> 'the cultural mass', hasbeen to increasing inequalities <strong>of</strong> income (figure 2.15), perhaps presagingthe rise <strong>of</strong> a new aristocracy <strong>of</strong> labour as well as the eme(gence <strong>of</strong>an ill-remunerated and broadly disempowered under-class (Dahrendorf,1987; Wilson, 1987). This, however, poses serious problems <strong>of</strong>sustaining effective demand and raises the spectre <strong>of</strong> a crisis <strong>of</strong> underconsumption- the kind <strong>of</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> crisis that FordismKeynesianism proved most adept at avoiding. I do not, therefore, seethe neo-conservative monetarism that attaches to flexible modes <strong>of</strong>accumulation and the overall devaluation <strong>of</strong> labour power throughenhanced labour control as <strong>of</strong>fering even a short-term solution to thecrisis-tendencies <strong>of</strong> capitalism. <strong>The</strong> budget deficit <strong>of</strong> the United Stateshas, I think, been very important to the stabilization <strong>of</strong> capitalismthese last few years, and if that proves unsustainable, then the path<strong>of</strong> capitalist accumulation world-wide will be rocky indeed.What does seem special about the period since 1972 is the extra-38363432302826242220% 02.12.01.91.81.7x 1.5 -C1l"t:IcoAssetspercentage <strong>of</strong> US assets owned bywealthiest 1 % <strong>of</strong> the population70170777,9:.>.;7,9(96'Figu.re 2.15 Inequality <strong>of</strong> asset ownership (1810-1987) and in incomes(1963-1985) in the United States(Souces: Historical Statistics <strong>of</strong> the United States, Economic Reports to thePresldent, Harrison and Bluestone, 1988)