The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning

270 The experience of space and timeput a philosophical nail in the coffin of rationalist ideals of homogeneousand absolute space (Kern, 1983, 150-1).I have cited just a few of the incidents that Kern records in orderto convey a sense of the confusions rampant in social and culturalthought in the period 1910-14. But matters can, I think, be taken astep further, hinging an argument on an idea that Kern launches butmakes very little of: 'One response was a growing sense of unityamong people formerly isolated in distance and lack of communication.This was not, however, unambiguous, because proximity alsogenerated anxiety - apprehension that the neighbours were seen asgetting a bit too close' (p. 88). How was this 'ambiguity' expressed?Two broad and rather distinctive currents of thought can be identifieddepending upon the emphasis upon unity or difference.Those who emphasized the unity between peoples also acceptedthe 'unreality of place' within a fragmented relative space. Celebratingthe annihilation of space through time, the task was to re-Iaunch theEnlightenment project of universal human emancipation in a globalspace bound together through mechanisms of communication andsocial intervention. Such a project implied, however, spatial fragmentationthrough planned co-ordination. And how could that bedone except through 'pulverizing' pre-existing spaces in some manner?Ford had shown how social processes could be speeded up, andproductive forces augmented, by the spatia liz at ion of time. Theproblem was to harness this capacity to human emancipation ratherthan to some narrow set of interests, such as those of capital. AGerman group proposed in 1911, for example, the creation of a'world office' that would 'unify all the humanitarian tendencies thatrun in parallel but disorderly directions, and bring about a concentrationand a promotion of all creative activities' (quoted in Tafuri,1985, 122). It was only in such a context of rationalized and totallyorganized external and public space, that interior and very privatesenses of time and space could properly flourish. The space of thebody, of consciousness, of the psyche - spaces kept too long repressed,given the absolute suppositions of Enlightenment thought,but now opening up as a consequence of psychological and philosophicalfindings - could be liberated only through the rationalorganization of exterior space and time. But rationality now meantsomething more than planning with the aid of the map and thechronometer, or subjecting all of social life to time and motionstudy. New senses of relativism and perspectivism could be inventedand applied to the production of space and the ordering of time. Thiskind of reaction, which many were later to dub as exclusively modernist,typically entailed a whole set of accoutrements. DespisingThe rise of modernism as a cultural force 271history, it sought entirely new cultural forms that broke with thepast and solely spoke the language of the new. Holding that formfollowed function and that spatial rationality should be imposed onthe external world in order to maximize individual liberty and welfare,it took efficiency and function (and hence the image of themetropolis as a well-oiled machine) as its central motif. It had adeep concern for purity of language, no matter whether it was inarchitecture, music, or literature.It is an open question, of course, whether this response was a purebowing down to the force of spatial and temporal restructuring ofthe period (see above, pp. 28-31). Fernand Leger, the French cubistpainter, certainly thought so, observing in 1913 that life was 'morefragmented and faster moving than in previous periods' and that itwas essential to devise a dynamic art to depict it (quoted in Kern,1983, 118). And Gertrude Stein certainly interpreted cultural events,such as the advent of cubism, as a response to the time- spacecompression to which everyone was exposed and sensitized. This inno way detracts, of course, from the importance of grappling withthat experience in the field of representation in such a way as toenhance, support, and perhaps even command the processes thatseemed to be escaping from all forms of collective control (as theywere indeed set to do in World War I). But it does re-focus ourattention on the practical ways in which that might be done. LeCorbusier was, in effect, merely following the Jeffersonian principlesof land partition when he argued that the way to individual libertyand freedom lay through the construction of a highly ordered andrationalized space. His project was internationalist, and emphasizedthe kind of unity in which a socially conscious notion of individualdifference could be fully explored.The other kind of reaction bundled together a host of seeminglydivergent responses built, however, around one central principlewhich I shall later have frequent cause to invoke: that the moreunified the space, the more important the qualities of the fragmentationsbecome for social identity and action. The free flow of capitalacross the surface of the globe, for example, places strong emphasisupon the particular qualities of the spaces to which that capital might.be attracted. The shrinkage of space that brings diverse communitiesacross the globe into competition with each other implies localizedcompetitive strategies and a heightened sense of awareness of whatmakes a place special and gives it a competitive advantage. This kindof reaction looks much more strongly to the identification of place,the building and signalling of its unique qualities in an increasinglyhomogeneous but fragmented world (see above, pp. 88-92).