122 Political-economic capitalist transformationtaking the form <strong>of</strong> norms, habits, laws, regulating networks and soon that ensure the unity <strong>of</strong> the process, i.e. the appropriate consistency<strong>of</strong> individual behaviours with the schema <strong>of</strong> reproduction.This body <strong>of</strong> interiorized rules and social processes is called themode <strong>of</strong> regulation' (Lipietz, 1986, 19).This kind <strong>of</strong> language is useful, in the first instance, as a heuristicdevice. It focuses our attention upon the complex interrelations,habits, political practices, and cultural forms that allow a highlydynamic, and consequently unstable, capitalist system to acquiresufficient semblance <strong>of</strong> order to function coherently at least for acertain period <strong>of</strong> time.<strong>The</strong>re are two broad areas <strong>of</strong> difficulty within a capitalist economicsystem that have to be successfully negotiated if that system is toremain viable. <strong>The</strong> first arises out <strong>of</strong> the anarchic qualities <strong>of</strong> pricefixingmarkets, and the second derives from the need to exert sufficientcontrol over the way labour power is deployed to guarantee theaddition <strong>of</strong> value in production and, hence, positive pr<strong>of</strong>its for asmany capitalists as possible.Price-fixing markets, to take up the first problem, typically provideinnumerable and highly decentralized signals that allow producers toco-ordinate output decisions with the needs, wants, and desires <strong>of</strong>consumers (subject, <strong>of</strong> course, to the budget and cost constraints thataffect both parties to any market transaction). But Adam Smith'scelebrated 'hidden hand' <strong>of</strong> the market has never been sufficient initself to guarantee stable growth for capitalism, even when the backgroundinstitutions (private property, enforceable contracts, appropriatemanagement <strong>of</strong> money) have been functioning properly. Somedegree <strong>of</strong> collective action - usually state regulation and intervention- is needed to compensate for the market failures (such as unpriceddamages to the natural and social environment), to prevent excessiveconcentrations <strong>of</strong> market power, or to check the abuse <strong>of</strong> monopolyprivilege where such cannot be avoided (in fields such as transportand communications), to provide collective goods (defence, education,social and psysical infrastructures) that cannot be produced and soldthrough the market, and to guard against runaway failures due tospeculative surges, aberrant market signals, and the potentially negativeinterplay between entrepreneurial expectations and marketsignals (the problem <strong>of</strong> self-fulfilling prophecies in market performance).In practice, collective pressures exercised by the state orother institutions (religious, political, trade union, business community,and cultural organizations) together with the exercise <strong>of</strong>dominant market power by large corporations and other powerfulinstitutions, affect capitalism's dynamic in vital ways. <strong>The</strong> pressuresIntroduction 123can be direct (such as mandated wage and price controls) or indirect(such as subliminal advertising that persuades us to new concepts <strong>of</strong>our basic needs and desires in life), but the net effect is to shape thetrajectory and form <strong>of</strong> capitalist development in ways that cannot beunderstood simply by analysis <strong>of</strong> market transactions. Furthermore,social and psychological propensities, such as individualism and thedrive for personal fulfillment through self-expression, the search forsecurity and collective identity, the . need to acquire self-respect,status, or some other mark <strong>of</strong> individual identity, all play a role inshaping modes <strong>of</strong> consumption and life-styles. One only has tocontemplate the whole complex <strong>of</strong> forces implicated in the proliferation<strong>of</strong> mass automobile production, ownership, and use to recognizethe vast range <strong>of</strong> social, psychological, political, as well asmore conventionally understood economic meanings which attach toone <strong>of</strong> the key growth sectors <strong>of</strong> twentieth-century capitalism. <strong>The</strong>virtue <strong>of</strong> 'regulation school' thinking is that it insists we look at thetotal package <strong>of</strong> relations and arrangements that contribute to thestabilization <strong>of</strong> output growth and aggregate distribution <strong>of</strong> incomeand consumption in a particular historical period and place.<strong>The</strong> second arena <strong>of</strong> general difficulty in capitalist societies concernsthe conversion <strong>of</strong> men and women's capacity to do active workinto a labour process whose fruits can be appropriated by capitalists.Labour <strong>of</strong> any kind requires a certain concentration, self-discipline,habituation to different instruments <strong>of</strong> production, and knowledge<strong>of</strong> the potentialities <strong>of</strong> various raw materials for conversion intouseful products. Commodity production under conditions <strong>of</strong> wagelabour, however, locates much <strong>of</strong> the knowledge, decisions as totechnique, as well as disciplinary apparatus, outside the control <strong>of</strong>the person who actually does the work. <strong>The</strong> habituation <strong>of</strong> wagelabourers to capitalism was a long-drawn-out (and not particularlyhappy) historical process, that has to be renewed with the addition<strong>of</strong> each new generation <strong>of</strong> workers into the labour force. <strong>The</strong> disciplining<strong>of</strong> labour power to the purposes <strong>of</strong> capital accumulation -a process I shall generally refer to as 'labour control' - is a veryintricate affair. It entails, in the first instance, some mix <strong>of</strong> repression,habituation, co-optation and co-operation, all <strong>of</strong> which have to beorganized not only within the workplace but throughout society atlarge. <strong>The</strong> socialization <strong>of</strong> the worker to conditions <strong>of</strong> capitalistproduction entails the social control <strong>of</strong> physical and mental powerson a very broad basis. Education, training, persuasion, the mobilization<strong>of</strong> certain social sentiments (the work ethic, company loyalty, nationalor local pride) and psychological propensities (the search foridentity through work, individual initiative, or social solidarity) all
124 Political-economic capitalist transformationplay a role and are plainly mixed in with the formation <strong>of</strong> dominantideologies cultivated by the mass media, religious and educationalinstitutions, the various arms <strong>of</strong> the state apparatus, and asserted bysimple articulation <strong>of</strong> their experience on the part <strong>of</strong> those who dothe work. Here, too, the 'mode <strong>of</strong> regulation' becomes a useful wayto conceptualize how the problems <strong>of</strong> organizing labour power forpurposes <strong>of</strong> capital accumulation are worked out in particular placesand times.I broadly accept the view that the long postwar boom, from 1945to 1973, was built upon a certain set <strong>of</strong> labour control practices,technological mixes, consumption habits, and configurations <strong>of</strong> political-economicpower, and that this configuration can reasonably becalled Fordist-Keynesian. <strong>The</strong> break up <strong>of</strong> this system since 1973has inaugurated a period <strong>of</strong> rapid change, flux, and uncertainty.Whether or not the new systems <strong>of</strong> production and marketing,characterized by more flexible labour processes and markets, <strong>of</strong>geographical mobility and rapid shifts in consumption practices,warrant the title <strong>of</strong> a new regime <strong>of</strong> accumulation, and whether therevival <strong>of</strong> entrepreneurial ism and <strong>of</strong> neo-conservatism, coupled withthe cultural turn to postmodernism, warrant the title <strong>of</strong> a new mode<strong>of</strong> regulation, is by no means clear. <strong>The</strong>re is always a danger <strong>of</strong>confusing the transitory and the ephemeral with more fundamentaltransformations in political-economic life. But the contrasts betweenpresent political-economic practices and those <strong>of</strong> the postwarboom period are sufficiently strong to make the hypothesis <strong>of</strong> ashift from Fordism to what might be called a 'flexible' regime <strong>of</strong>accumulation a telling way to characterize recent history. And whileI shall, for didactic purposes, emphasize the contrasts in what follows,I shall return to the evaluative question <strong>of</strong> how fundamental thechanges really are by way <strong>of</strong> general conclusion.8Fordism<strong>The</strong> symbolic initiation date <strong>of</strong> Fordism must, surely, be 1914, whenHenry Ford introduced his five-dollar, eight-hour day as recompensefor workers manning the automated car-assembly line he hadestablished the year before at Dearborn, Michigan. But the manner<strong>of</strong> general implantation <strong>of</strong> Fordism was very much more complicatedthan that.Ford's organizational and technological innovations were, in manyrespects, a simple extension <strong>of</strong> well-established trends. <strong>The</strong> corporateform <strong>of</strong> business organization, for example, had been perfected bythe railroads throughout the nineteenth century, and had alreadyspread, particularly after the wave <strong>of</strong> mergers, trust and cartel formationat the end <strong>of</strong> the century, to many industrial sectors (onethird <strong>of</strong> US manufacturing assets were subject to merger in the years1898-1902 alone). Ford likewise did little more than rationalize oldtechnologies and a pre-existing detail division <strong>of</strong> labour, though byflowing the work to a stationary worker he achieved dramatic gainsin productivity. F. W. Taylor'S <strong>The</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> scientific management- an influential tract which described how labour productivitycould be radically increased by breaking down each labour processinto component motions and organizing fragmented work tasks accordingto rigorous standards <strong>of</strong> time and motion study - had, afterall, been published in 1911. And Taylor's thinking had a long ancestry,going back via Gilbreth's experiments <strong>of</strong> the 1890s to the works <strong>of</strong>mid-nineteenth-century writers like Ure and Babbage, which Marxhad found so revealing. <strong>The</strong> separation between management, conception,control, and execution (and all that this meant in terms <strong>of</strong>hierarchical social relations and de-skilling within the labour process)was also already well under way in many industries. What wasspecial about Ford (and what ultimately separates Fordism fromTaylorism), was his vision, his explicit recognition that mass pro-