The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning

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134 Political-economic capitalist transformationof 'games' of resistance to any excessive incursions of capitalistpower on the shop floor (with respect, for example, to the pace ofwork). He thus broadly confirms with American data the profile ofthe co-operation stance of The affluent worker compiled by Goldthorpein Britain. Yet there has been a sufficient record of sudden eruptionsof discontent, even among affluent workers (in, for example, theGeneral Motors plant at Lordstown shortly after it opened, or amongthe affluent car workers that Goldthorpe studied) to suggest that thismay be more of a surface adaptation than a total reconstruction ofworker attitudes with respect to assembly-line production. The perpetualproblem of habituating the worker to such routinized, deskilledand degraded systems of work, as Braverman (1974) forcefullyargues, can never be completely overcome. Nevertheless, bureaucratizedtrade union organizations were increasingly corralled (sometimesthrough the exercise of repressive state power) into the cornerof swapping real wage gains for co-operation in disciplining workersto the Fordist production system.The roles of the other partners in the general, if often tacit, socialcontract that reigned over the postwar boom were similarly welldefined. Large corporate power was deployed to assure steady growthin investments that enhanced productivity, guaranteed growth, andraised living standards while ensuring a stable basis for gaining profits.This implied a corporate commitment to steady but powerful processesof technological change, mass fixed capital investment, growthof managerial expertise in both production and marketing, and themobilization of economies of scale through standardization of product.The strong centralization of capital that had been such a conspicuousfeature of US capitalism since 1900 allowed the curbing ofinter-capitalist competition within an all-powerful US economy andthe emergence of oligopolistic and monopoly pricing and planningpractices. Scientific management of all facets of corporate activity(not only production, but also personnel relations, on-the-job training,marketing, product design, pricing strategies, planned obsolescenceof equipment and product) became the hallmark of bureaucratic corporaterationality. The decisions of corporations became hegemonicin defining the paths of mass consumption growth, presuming, ofcourse, that the other two partners in the grand coalition did whateverwas necessary to keep effective demand at levels sufficientto absorb the steady growth of capitalist output. The massing ofworkers in large-scale factories always posed, however, the threat ofstronger labour organization and enhanced working-class power -hence the importance of the political attack upon radical elementswithin the labour movement after 1945. Nevertheless, corporationsFordism 135grudgingly accepted union power, particularly when the unionsundertook to control their membership and collaborate with managementin plans to raise productivity in return for wage gains thatstimulated effective demand in the way that Ford had originallyenvisaged.The state, for its part, assumed a variety of obligations. To thedegree that mass production requiring heavy investment in fixedcapital in turn required relatively stable demand conditions to beprofitable, so the state strove to curb business cycles through anappropriate mix of fiscal and monetary policies in the postwar period.Such policies were directed towards those areas of public investment- in sectors like transportation, public utilities, etc. - that were vitalto the growth of both mass production and mass consumption, andwhich would also guarantee relatively full employment. Governmentslikewise moved to provide a strong underpinning to the social wagethrough expenditures covering social security, health care, education,housing, and the like. In addition, state power was deployed, eitherdirectly or indirectly, to affect wage agreements and the rights ofworkers in production.The forms of state interventionism varied greatly across the advancedcapitalist countries. Table 2.2 illustrates, for example, thevariety of postures taken by different governments in Western Europein relation to wage contract regotiations. Similar qualitative as well asquantitative differences can be found in the patterning of publicexpenditures, the organization of welfare systems (kept very muchwithin the corporation in the Japanese case, for example), and thedegree of active as opposed to tacit state involvement in economicdecisions. Patterns of labour unrest, shop-floor organizing and unionactivism likewise varied considerably from state to state (Lash andUrry, 1987). But what is remarkable is the way in which nationalgovernments of quite different ideological complexions - Gaullist inFrance, the Labour Party in Britain, Christian Democrats in WestGermany, etc. - engineered both stable economic growth and risingmaterial living standards through a mix of welfare statism, Keynesianeconomic management, and control over wage relations. Fordismdepended, evidently, upon the nation state taking - much as Gramscipredicted - a very special role within the overall system of socialregulation.Postwar Fordism has to be seen, therefore, less as a mere systemof mass production and more as a total way of life. Mass productionmeant standardization of product as well as mass consumption; andthat meant a whole new aesthetic and a commodification of culturethat many neo-conservatives, such as Daniel Bell, were later to see as
136 Political-economic capitalist transformationTable 2.2 The organization of wage bargaining in four countries,1950-1975UnionsMembershipFrancelowOrganization weak withpoliticalfactionalismOwnersStatedivided amongtendencies andorganizationswidespread. .mterventlonsand regulationof work andwages throughtripartiteaccordsSource: after Boyer, 1986b, table 1Britainhigh bluecollarfragmentedbetweenindustries andtradesweakcollectiveorganizationvoluntarycollectivebargainingwith state-setnorms aftermid-1960sItalyvariableperiodicwith massmovementsprivate-publicrivalryperiodiclegislative. .mterventlondepending onclass struggleWestGermanymoderatestructuredand unifiedpowerfulandorganizedvery weakroledetrimental to the preservation of the work ethic and other supposedcapitalist virtues. Fordism also built upon and contributed to theaesthetic of modernism - particularly the latter's penchant for functionalityand efficiency - in very explicit ways, while the forms ofstate interventionism (guided by principles of bureaucratic-technicalrationality), and the configuration of political power that gave thesystem its coherence, rested on notions of a mass economic democracywelded together through a balance of special-interest forces.Postwar Fordism was also very much an international affair. Thelong postwar boom was crucially dependent upon a massive expansionof world trade and international investment flows. Slow todevelop outside the United States before 1939, Fordism becamemore firmly implanted in both Europe and Japan after 1940 as partof the war effort. It was consolidated and expanded in the postwarperiod, either directly through policies imposed in the occupationFordism 137(or, more paradoxically, in the French case, because the communistledunions saw Fordism as the only way to assure national economicautonomy in the face of the American challenge) or indirectly throughthe Marshall Plan and subsequent US direct investment. The latter,which had sputtered along in the inter-war years as US corporationssought market outlets overseas to overcome the limits of internaleffective demand, sprang to life after 1945. This opening up offoreign investment (chiefly in Europe) and trade permitted surplusproductive capacity in the United States to be absorbed elsewhere,while the progress of Fordism internationally meant the formation ofglobal mass markets and the absorption of the mass of the world'spopulation, outside the communist world, into the global dynamicsof a new kind of capitalism. Furthermore, uneven development withinthe world economy meant the experience of already muted businesscycles as so many local and broadly compensating oscillations withina fairly stable growth of world demand. At the input end, the openingup of foreign trade meant the globalization of the supply of oftencheaper raw materials (particularly energy supplies). The new internationalismalso brought a whole host of other activities in its wake- banking, insurance, services, hotels, airports, and ultimately tourism.It carried with it a new international culture and relied heavilyupon new-found capacities to gather, evaluate, and disseminateinformation.All of this was secured under the hegemonic umbrella of theUnited States' financial and economic power backed by militarydomination. The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 turned the dollarinto the world's reserve currency and tied the world's economicdevelopment firmly into US fiscal and monetary policy. The UnitedStates acted as the world's banker in return for an opening up of theworld's commodity and capital markets to the power of the largecorporations. Under this umbrella, Fordism spread unevenly as eachstate sought its own mode of management of labour relations, monetaryand fiscal policy, welfare and public investment strategies,limited internally only by the state of class relations and externallyonly by its hierarchical position in the world economy and by thefixed exchange rate against the dollar. The international spread ofFordism occurred, therefore, within a particular frame of internationalpolitical- economic regulation and a geopolitical configuration inwhich the United States dominated through a very distinctive systemof military alliances and power relations.Not everyone was included in the benefits of Fordism, and therewere, to be sure, abundant signs of discontent even at the system'sapogee. To begin with, Fordist wage bargaining was confined tocertain sectors of the economy and certain nation states where stable
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The Conditionof PostmodernityAn Enq
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PrefaceI cannot remember exactly wh
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Introduction 5theatre, a series of
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