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The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning

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140 Political-economic capitalist transformationthreatened and the USA, which began the postwar era by using anticommunismand militarism as a vehicle for geopolitical and economicstabilization, soon found itself facing the problem <strong>of</strong> 'guns or butter'in its own fiscal economic policy.But in spite <strong>of</strong> all the discontents and all the manifest tensions, thecentrepieces <strong>of</strong> the Fordist regime held firm at least until 1973, andin the process did indeed manage to keep a postwar boom intact thatfavoured unionized labour, and to some degree spread the 'benefits'<strong>of</strong> mass production and consumption even further afield. Materialliving standards rose for the mass <strong>of</strong> the population in the advancedcapitalist countries, and a relatively stable environment for corporatepr<strong>of</strong>its prevailed. It was not until the sharp recession <strong>of</strong> 1973 shatteredthat framework that a process <strong>of</strong> rapid, and as yet not well understood,transition in the regime <strong>of</strong> accumulation began.9From Fordism to flexibleaccumulationIn retrospect, it seems there were signs <strong>of</strong> serious problems withinFordism as early as the mid-1960s. By then, the West European andJapanese recoveries were complete, their internal market saturated,and the drive to create export markets for their surplus output had tobegin (figure 2.3). And this occurred at the very moment when thesuccess <strong>of</strong> Fordist rationalization meant the relative displacement <strong>of</strong>more and more workers from manufacturing. <strong>The</strong> consequent slackening<strong>of</strong> effective demand was <strong>of</strong>fset in the United States by the waron poverty and the war in Vietnam. But declining corporate productivityand pr<strong>of</strong>itability after 1966 (figure 2.4) meant the beginnings<strong>of</strong> a fiscal problem in the United States that would not go awayexcept at the price <strong>of</strong> an acceleration in inflation, which began toundermine the role <strong>of</strong> the dollar as a stable international reservecurrency. <strong>The</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> the Eurodollar market, and the creditcrunch <strong>of</strong> 1966-7, were indeed prescient signals <strong>of</strong> the United States'diminished power to regulate the international financial system. Itwas at about this time too that import substitution policies in manyThird World countries (particularly Latin America), coupled withthe first big push by multinationals into <strong>of</strong>fshore manufacturing(particularly in South-East Asia), brought a wave <strong>of</strong> competitiveFordist industrialization to entirely new environments, where thesocial contract with labour was either weakly enforced or nonexistent.International competition thereafter intensified as WesternEurope and Japan, joined by a whole host <strong>of</strong> newly industrializingcountries, challenged United States hegemony within Fordism to thepoint where the Bretton Woods agreement cracked and the dollarwas devalued. Floating and <strong>of</strong>ten highly volatile exchange rates thereafterreplaced the fixed exchange rates <strong>of</strong> the postwar boom (figure2.5).More generally, the period from 1965 to 1973 was one in which the

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