hearing

1014210. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies andForeign Liaison ServicesThe subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and biologicalagents abroad were generally being held for interrogation byforeign intelligence or security organizations. Although informationabout the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations,cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security ofCIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the AmericanGovernment in a position of complicity in actions which violated therights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of thecountry in which the experiments took place.Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations inforeign countries was not limited to relationships with the intelligenceor internal security organizations. Some MKULTRA research wasconducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not a questionable practice,it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evadeAmerican laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTI-CHOKE memorandum in which it is noted that working with thescientists of a foreign country "might be very advantageous" sincethat government "permitted certain activities which were not permittedby the United States government (i.e., experimeits on anthrax,etc.). "1313. The Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agenciesand Other Agencies of the U.S. GovernmentCertain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts ofintelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to provide"cover" for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, inorder to disguise intelligence community interest in chemical andbiological agents.Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Althoughthe CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSDwas conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there was no openconnection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureauwas serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace Agencyparticipation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA'sability to control the program. The Agency could not control theprocess by which subjects were selected and cultivated, and could notregulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA's InspectorGeneral noted: "the handling of test subjects in the last analysis restswith the [Bureau of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression ofknowledge of critical results from the top CIA management is aninherent risk in these operations." 132 The arrangement also made itimpossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end thesurreptitious administration of LSD would be honored by the Bureaupersonnel.The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as"informal." 113 The informality of the arrangement compounded theproblem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-13 ARTICHOKE Memorandum, 6/13/52.IG Report on M1KULTRA. 1963, p. 14.'xIbid.. This was taken by one Agency official to mean that there would be nowritten contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 31.)