72392subjects-the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use andthey had been used in six different operations on a total of thirty-threesubjects.' By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had increasedsubstantially.In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector Generalsurvey of the Technical Services Division, a member of the InspectorGeneral's staff, John Vance, learned about MKULTRA and aboutthe project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting,nonvoluntary human subjects. As a result. of the discoveryand the Inspector General's subsequent -report, this testing was haltedand much tighter administrative controls were imposed on the program.According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantlyeach budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.5. The Testing of LSD by the ArmyThere were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In thefirst, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers whovolunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In thesecond phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers receivedLSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potentialintelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRDCHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjectswere interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational fieldtests.B. CIA DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS1. The Rationale for the Testing ProgramsThe late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concern overthe threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People'sRepublic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United Statesconcern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powerswas acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biologicalagents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designedto harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pressurefor a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biologicalagents so that the intelligence community could understand the mechanismsby which these substances worked and how their effects couldbe defeated.,"Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had receivedreports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to produceLSD; and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase theworld's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeplyinvolved in work with this drug described the climate of the times:"[It] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frighteningall of this was to us at the time, particularly after the drug scene hasbecome as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did.But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that weIbid, 1957, p. 201.sThus an officer in the Office of Security of the CIA stressed the "urgency ofthe discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel, in theevent of their capture by the enemy, to resist or defeat enemy interrogation."(Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)
393had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilitiesif used wrongly." 19But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical andbiological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . .for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing ornot" and in order to "develop means for the control of the activities andmental capacities of individuals whether willing or not." 20 OneAgency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain controlof bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of removingpersonnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. 21Inother programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, andmaintain in operational readiness materials which could be used toharass, disable, or kill specific targets. 22Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People'sRepublic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries providedthe basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defensiveto an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff ofthe Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952:There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogationsthat the Communists were utilizing drugs, physicalduress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their enemies.With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from becomingrabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by thismounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in thedevelopment of these techniques, but must be cautious tomaintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc thatcould be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands. 2 3In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, substantialprograms for the testing and use of chemical and biologicalagents-including projects involving the surreptitious administrationof LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels,high and low, native American and foreign"-were conceived, andimplemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of therights of individuals within the United States.1 Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.'0 Memorandum from the Director of Security to ARTICHOKE representatives,Subject: "ARTICHOKE Restatement of Program."n ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53." The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services Divisionnoted that "Six specific products have been developed and are available for operationaluse. Three of them are discrediting and disabling materials which can beadministered unwittingly and permit the exercise of a measure of control over theactions of the subject."A memorandum for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief, TSD,10/18/67, described two of the objectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOMI as:"to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use ofTSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique items forthe dissemination of biological and chemical materals."' Memorandum from the Chief of the Medical Staff, 1/25/52.
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PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM
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CONTESTSStatements of:PageAdmiral S
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destruction of MKULTRA files in 197
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and harassment substances (pp. 4, 1
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The material in 1975 was also spars
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Tenth, there are six subprojects on
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or damage to their reputations whic
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In early June, however, he discover
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17You know, much of the research wh
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efore, and I am hopeful we can get
- Page 26 and 27: Counsel's opinion was that this was
- Page 28 and 29: Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were
- Page 30 and 31: these were going on, especially whe
- Page 32 and 33: Only a handful of cases in which sc
- Page 34 and 35: 29another threatened to kill on sig
- Page 36 and 37: Rarely has a drug interrogation inv
- Page 38 and 39: 33REFERENCES1. Adams, E. Barbiturat
- Page 40 and 41: of Central Intelligence, subproject
- Page 42 and 43: for his own particular reasons not
- Page 44 and 45: projects will be completely deniabl
- Page 46 and 47: with that, but apparently for at le
- Page 48 and 49: Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there
- Page 50 and 51: Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about
- Page 52 and 53: who, if either of us, should get in
- Page 54 and 55: and the new documentation and the n
- Page 56 and 57: Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittin
- Page 58 and 59: of those programs and your name is
- Page 60 and 61: Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.Senator KENNEDY. W
- Page 62 and 63: And among other things, we decided
- Page 64 and 65: Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not in
- Page 66 and 67: Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want
- Page 68 and 69: Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I ha
- Page 70 and 71: 386ties would have serious repercus
- Page 72 and 73: 388that no damage was done to indiv
- Page 74 and 75: 390funding mechanism for highly sen
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- Page 80 and 81: 396proval of his immediate supervis
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- Page 84 and 85: 400"observe the behavior of unwitti
- Page 86 and 87: 402If one grants the validity of th
- Page 88 and 89: 84404well, so that anybody who assi
- Page 90 and 91: 86406result was that the Agency had
- Page 92 and 93: 88- 408In 1963, the Inspector Gener
- Page 94 and 95: 90410QKHILLTOP, another group desig
- Page 96 and 97: 4121. Scope of TestingBetween 1955
- Page 98 and 99: 414general lack of interagency comm
- Page 100 and 101: 416For the next 28 minutes, the sub
- Page 102 and 103: 418This problem was compounded by t
- Page 104 and 105: 420The subsequent adoption of this
- Page 106 and 107: 422apparent unwillingness on the pa
- Page 108 and 109: 104u E T: Request for Guidance on H
- Page 110 and 111: The Didctor of Central Intelligence
- Page 112 and 113: 109APPENDIX CDOCUMENTS REFERRING TO
- Page 114 and 115: 111PROPOSAL.Objective:To study the
- Page 116 and 117: 113date -J.UN -In' 3.2 Lugo"tJ,55MI
- Page 118 and 119: 115r urel avesaio'hi n tvopezied--
- Page 120 and 121: 117The present ± vdstigation is co
- Page 122 and 123: 11925 AuguSt 1955MERANDUM FOR:SUBJE
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1235 May 1955A "-ticn of the 1Rosec
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125The propozed facilityoj2S~ffara
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ads for tihs purpose through the co
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663, dated 26 August 1954, funds ar
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131.VI.Comments by the Office of Ge
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133Ll-rezlh l-te fle on*~tA Subproj
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135II.Background of theTh was incor
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137VI.Difficulties Faced by TSS.It
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139morale booster.(e)Human patients
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141XI.Resultant Financial Saving.Th
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143length about his -- "pcrimear.*
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Mr.Page Twodelay this matter for a
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147rubjects varies from t::.0-ty' '
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149tetrhr;eocrnnabbol nctata Ceriva
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151DRAPT/a"o30 January 1961V2240RAN
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153EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT:
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1551MMAManuman re' rsCOR-sUM FORt.
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1571960The researci to be undertake
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159.MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconnSUBJEC
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161MMORANDM FOR: TE MODSUBJECTConti
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163MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD o LtSU
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165SUBJECT:Request for Support of R
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1671.1 Trotter. W. defies brain con
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MATERIAL FOR THE RECORDMKSEARCH. OF
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171QKHILLTOP DEFINITIONQKHILLTOP wa