390funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and developmentprojects that studied the use of biological and chemical materialsin altering human behavior. The projects involved:Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biologicaland chemical materials. This alea involves the productionof various physiological conditions which could supportpresent or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offefisivepotential, the development of a comprehensive capabilityin this field of covert chemical and biological warfaregives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoreticalpotential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foewho might not be as restrained in the use of these techniquesas we are. 1 2MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along thelines proposed by ADDP Helms.Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special fundingmechanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General'ssurvey of MKULTRA in 1963 noted the following reasons for thissensitivity:a. Rih earch in the mailipulation of human behavior is consideredby man7. zuthorities in medicine and related fieldsto be professionaily unethical, therefore the reputation ofprofessional participants in the MIKULTRA-program are onoccasion in jeopardy.b. Some MKILTRA activities raise questions of legalityimplicit in the original charter.- c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA productsplaces the rights and interests of U.S. citi7ens in jeopardy.d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activitycould induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. publicopinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive actionin this field on the part of foreign intelligence services."3Over the ten-year life of the program, many "additional avenues tothe control of human behavior" were designated as appropriate forinvestigation under the MICULTRA charter. These include "radiation,electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, andanthropoloy, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitarydevices and materials." 14The research and development of materials to be used for alteringhuman behavior consisted of three phases: first, the search for materialssuitable for study; second, laboratory testing on voluntaryhuman snbiects in various types of institutions; third, the applicationof MKTTLTRA materials in normal life settings.The search for suitable materials was conducted through standingarrangements with snecialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses,hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research orgamu'femorandumfrom ADDP Holms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab A, pp. 1-2.T.G. Report on MKULTRA, 1963, pp. 1-2.rbid, p. 4.
71391zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were madeunder ostensible research foundation auspices, thereby concealing theCIA's interest from the specialist's institution.The next phase of the MKITLTRA program involved physicians,toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and generalhospitals, and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of thebasic research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.I One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute ofMental Health. This study was intended to test various drugs, includinghallucinogenics, at the NIMH Addiction Research Center in Lexington,Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center," as it wasthen called, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drugviolations.The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a briefphysical examination and signing a general consent form, were administeredhallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in theprogram, the addicts were provided with the druz of their addiction.LSD was one of the materials tested in the MIKULTRA program.The final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administrationto unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by undercoverofficers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA.The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials underaccepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactionsand attributions that may occur in operational situations." 15According to the CIA, the advantage of the relationship with theBureau was thattest subjects could be sought and cultivated within the settingof narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers ormembers of suspect criminal elements from whom the [Bureauof Narcotics] has obtained results of orwrational valuethrough the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of thesubstances on individuals at all social levels, high and low,native American and foreign, is of great significance andtesting has been performed an a variety of individuals withinthese categories. [Emphasis added.] 16A special procedure. designated MKDELTA, was es'ablished togovern the use of MKULTRA materials abrond. Such materials wereused on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA records weredostroved, it is imnossible to reconstruct the operational use ofMKULTRA materials by the CIA overseas; it has been determinedthat the use of these materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly asearly as 1950.Druns were used primarily as an aid to interrogations. butMKULTRA/MKDELTA materials were also used for harassment,discrediting, or disabling purposes. According to an Inspector GeneralSurvey of the Technical Services Division of the CIA in 1957-aninspection which did not discover the MKULTRA oroject involvingthe surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteerSIbid, p. 21.* Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM
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CONTESTSStatements of:PageAdmiral S
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destruction of MKULTRA files in 197
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and harassment substances (pp. 4, 1
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The material in 1975 was also spars
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Tenth, there are six subprojects on
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or damage to their reputations whic
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In early June, however, he discover
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17You know, much of the research wh
- Page 24 and 25: efore, and I am hopeful we can get
- Page 26 and 27: Counsel's opinion was that this was
- Page 28 and 29: Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were
- Page 30 and 31: these were going on, especially whe
- Page 32 and 33: Only a handful of cases in which sc
- Page 34 and 35: 29another threatened to kill on sig
- Page 36 and 37: Rarely has a drug interrogation inv
- Page 38 and 39: 33REFERENCES1. Adams, E. Barbiturat
- Page 40 and 41: of Central Intelligence, subproject
- Page 42 and 43: for his own particular reasons not
- Page 44 and 45: projects will be completely deniabl
- Page 46 and 47: with that, but apparently for at le
- Page 48 and 49: Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there
- Page 50 and 51: Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about
- Page 52 and 53: who, if either of us, should get in
- Page 54 and 55: and the new documentation and the n
- Page 56 and 57: Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittin
- Page 58 and 59: of those programs and your name is
- Page 60 and 61: Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.Senator KENNEDY. W
- Page 62 and 63: And among other things, we decided
- Page 64 and 65: Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not in
- Page 66 and 67: Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want
- Page 68 and 69: Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I ha
- Page 70 and 71: 386ties would have serious repercus
- Page 72 and 73: 388that no damage was done to indiv
- Page 76 and 77: 72392subjects-the CIA had developed
- Page 78 and 79: 394Although the CIA recognized thes
- Page 80 and 81: 396proval of his immediate supervis
- Page 82 and 83: 398Immediately after finding that O
- Page 84 and 85: 400"observe the behavior of unwitti
- Page 86 and 87: 402If one grants the validity of th
- Page 88 and 89: 84404well, so that anybody who assi
- Page 90 and 91: 86406result was that the Agency had
- Page 92 and 93: 88- 408In 1963, the Inspector Gener
- Page 94 and 95: 90410QKHILLTOP, another group desig
- Page 96 and 97: 4121. Scope of TestingBetween 1955
- Page 98 and 99: 414general lack of interagency comm
- Page 100 and 101: 416For the next 28 minutes, the sub
- Page 102 and 103: 418This problem was compounded by t
- Page 104 and 105: 420The subsequent adoption of this
- Page 106 and 107: 422apparent unwillingness on the pa
- Page 108 and 109: 104u E T: Request for Guidance on H
- Page 110 and 111: The Didctor of Central Intelligence
- Page 112 and 113: 109APPENDIX CDOCUMENTS REFERRING TO
- Page 114 and 115: 111PROPOSAL.Objective:To study the
- Page 116 and 117: 113date -J.UN -In' 3.2 Lugo"tJ,55MI
- Page 118 and 119: 115r urel avesaio'hi n tvopezied--
- Page 120 and 121: 117The present ± vdstigation is co
- Page 122 and 123: 11925 AuguSt 1955MERANDUM FOR:SUBJE
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121cherce c ontir.. the ro,:ect. if
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1235 May 1955A "-ticn of the 1Rosec
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125The propozed facilityoj2S~ffara
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ads for tihs purpose through the co
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663, dated 26 August 1954, funds ar
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131.VI.Comments by the Office of Ge
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133Ll-rezlh l-te fle on*~tA Subproj
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135II.Background of theTh was incor
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137VI.Difficulties Faced by TSS.It
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139morale booster.(e)Human patients
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141XI.Resultant Financial Saving.Th
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143length about his -- "pcrimear.*
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Mr.Page Twodelay this matter for a
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147rubjects varies from t::.0-ty' '
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149tetrhr;eocrnnabbol nctata Ceriva
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151DRAPT/a"o30 January 1961V2240RAN
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153EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT:
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1551MMAManuman re' rsCOR-sUM FORt.
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1571960The researci to be undertake
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159.MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconnSUBJEC
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161MMORANDM FOR: TE MODSUBJECTConti
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163MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD o LtSU
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165SUBJECT:Request for Support of R
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1671.1 Trotter. W. defies brain con
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MATERIAL FOR THE RECORDMKSEARCH. OF
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171QKHILLTOP DEFINITIONQKHILLTOP wa