394Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting individualswithin the United States, the project continued. 2 4 As theDeputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Directorof Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessationof unwitting testing:While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any programwhich tends to intrude upon an individual's privateand legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that theAgency maintain a central role in this activity, keep currenton enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior,and maintain an offensive capability. 25There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversialaspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress.The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets; evenDCI McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program involvingthe surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963. It wasdeemed imperative that these programs be concealed from the Americanpeople. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957:Precautions must be taken not only to protect operationsfrom exposure to enemyeforces but also to conceal these activitiesfrom the American public in general. The knowledgethat the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activitieswould have serious repercussions in political and diplomaticcircles and would be detrimental to the accomplishmentof its mission. 262. The Death of Dr. Frank OlsonThe most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was thedeath of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who diedon November 27, 1953. His death followed his participation in a CIAexperiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittinglyreceived approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreauhe drank on November 19, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottleby a CIA officer, Dr. Robert Lashbrook, as part of an experimenthe and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army andCIA scientists.Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoiaand schizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson soughtpsychiatric assistance in New York City from a physician, Dr. HaroldAbramson, whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly bythe CIA. While in New York for treatment, Olson fell to his deathfrom a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel.*" Even during the discussions which led to the termination of the unwittingtesting, the DDP turned down the option of halting such tests within the U.S.and continuing them abroad despite the fact that the Technical Services Divisionhad conducted numerous operations abroad making use of LSD. The DDPmade this decision on the basis of security noting that the past efforts overseashad resulted in "making an inordinate number of foreign nationals witting ofour role in the very sensitive activity." (Memorandum for the Deputy Directorof Central Intelligence from the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/63, p. 2.)' 5 Ibid., pp. 2-3.2 I.G. survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
395a. Background.-Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assignedto the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army BiologicalCenter at Camp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had threeprimary functions(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installationsto biological attack;(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biologicalweapons; and(3) biological research for the CIA. 2 7Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in boththe Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediatesuperior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact withOlson. According to Colonel Ruwet: "As a professional man . . . hisability . . . was outstanding." 28 Colonel Ruwet stated that "duringthe period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing whichwould lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind." " Dr. Lashbrook,who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952 untilthe time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD,"as far as I know, he was perfectly normal." 30 This assessment is indirect contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emotionalstability made in CIA internal memoranda written afterOlson's death.b. The Experiment.-On November 18, 1953, a group of ten scientistsfiom the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual reviewand analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Maryland.Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical ServicesStaff. The Detrick representatives were all from the SpecialOperations Division.According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Divisionparticipants "agreed that an unwitting experiment would bedesirable." "3 This account directly contradicts Vincent Ruwet's recollection.Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has asserted that hewould remember any such discussion because the SOD participantswould have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects. 3 2In May, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP, held a staff meetingwhich the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meetingHelms "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that heshould be advised at all times when it was intended to use it." 3 Inaddition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSSstating the requirement that the DDP personally approve the use ofLSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment, 34 securing the ap-27 Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75, p. 3." Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date,p. 2." Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.aJoseph B. Treaster, New York Times, 7/19/75, p. 1.Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick, 12/1/53, p. 1.2 Ruwet (staff summary), 8/13/75, p. 6.* Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53." Ibid. Dr. Gottleib has testified that he does not remember either the meetingwith Helms nor 'the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 16.)
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PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM
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CONTESTSStatements of:PageAdmiral S
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destruction of MKULTRA files in 197
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and harassment substances (pp. 4, 1
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The material in 1975 was also spars
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Tenth, there are six subprojects on
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or damage to their reputations whic
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In early June, however, he discover
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17You know, much of the research wh
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efore, and I am hopeful we can get
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Counsel's opinion was that this was
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- Page 32 and 33: Only a handful of cases in which sc
- Page 34 and 35: 29another threatened to kill on sig
- Page 36 and 37: Rarely has a drug interrogation inv
- Page 38 and 39: 33REFERENCES1. Adams, E. Barbiturat
- Page 40 and 41: of Central Intelligence, subproject
- Page 42 and 43: for his own particular reasons not
- Page 44 and 45: projects will be completely deniabl
- Page 46 and 47: with that, but apparently for at le
- Page 48 and 49: Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there
- Page 50 and 51: Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about
- Page 52 and 53: who, if either of us, should get in
- Page 54 and 55: and the new documentation and the n
- Page 56 and 57: Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittin
- Page 58 and 59: of those programs and your name is
- Page 60 and 61: Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.Senator KENNEDY. W
- Page 62 and 63: And among other things, we decided
- Page 64 and 65: Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not in
- Page 66 and 67: Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want
- Page 68 and 69: Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I ha
- Page 70 and 71: 386ties would have serious repercus
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- Page 74 and 75: 390funding mechanism for highly sen
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- Page 80 and 81: 396proval of his immediate supervis
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- Page 84 and 85: 400"observe the behavior of unwitti
- Page 86 and 87: 402If one grants the validity of th
- Page 88 and 89: 84404well, so that anybody who assi
- Page 90 and 91: 86406result was that the Agency had
- Page 92 and 93: 88- 408In 1963, the Inspector Gener
- Page 94 and 95: 90410QKHILLTOP, another group desig
- Page 96 and 97: 4121. Scope of TestingBetween 1955
- Page 98 and 99: 414general lack of interagency comm
- Page 100 and 101: 416For the next 28 minutes, the sub
- Page 102 and 103: 418This problem was compounded by t
- Page 104 and 105: 420The subsequent adoption of this
- Page 106 and 107: 422apparent unwillingness on the pa
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- Page 112 and 113: 109APPENDIX CDOCUMENTS REFERRING TO
- Page 114 and 115: 111PROPOSAL.Objective:To study the
- Page 116 and 117: 113date -J.UN -In' 3.2 Lugo"tJ,55MI
- Page 118 and 119: 115r urel avesaio'hi n tvopezied--
- Page 120 and 121: 117The present ± vdstigation is co
- Page 122 and 123: 11925 AuguSt 1955MERANDUM FOR:SUBJE
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125The propozed facilityoj2S~ffara
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ads for tihs purpose through the co
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663, dated 26 August 1954, funds ar
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131.VI.Comments by the Office of Ge
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133Ll-rezlh l-te fle on*~tA Subproj
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135II.Background of theTh was incor
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137VI.Difficulties Faced by TSS.It
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139morale booster.(e)Human patients
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141XI.Resultant Financial Saving.Th
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143length about his -- "pcrimear.*
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Mr.Page Twodelay this matter for a
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147rubjects varies from t::.0-ty' '
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149tetrhr;eocrnnabbol nctata Ceriva
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151DRAPT/a"o30 January 1961V2240RAN
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153EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT:
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1551MMAManuman re' rsCOR-sUM FORt.
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1571960The researci to be undertake
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159.MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconnSUBJEC
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161MMORANDM FOR: TE MODSUBJECTConti
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163MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD o LtSU
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165SUBJECT:Request for Support of R
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1671.1 Trotter. W. defies brain con
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MATERIAL FOR THE RECORDMKSEARCH. OF
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171QKHILLTOP DEFINITIONQKHILLTOP wa