84404well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would notbe subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if youwill."The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation,CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records."As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote inregulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience orof storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rulesmodified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart ofthis judgment is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstructedin later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the events." "The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossiblefor the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of thelargest CIA research program involving chemical and biologicalagents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and providingmedical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in theprogram. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining thefull extent of the operations which made use of materials developed inthe MKULTRA program. 7 7From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures werewaived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans,proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal sixpercent of the research and development budget of TSD would beexpended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations"because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also votedthat qualified individuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter intosigned agreements of any sort which connect them with this activitysince such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-" Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.'Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with individualsand organizations are retained without public disclosure. Moreover, in the case ofMKULTRA the CIA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials anddelivery systems which could be used by the Clandestine Services; the reconstructionof the research and development program would be difficult if not impossible,without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protestedagainst the document destruction on those grounds." Clandestine Services Institution (CSI) 70-10. When asked by the SelectCommittee about the regularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr.Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA records, Helms responded:"Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure ornot, because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certainpattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored bycertain people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose,would have been unusual. In other words, there were documents being destroyedbecause somebody had raised this specific issue rather than because they wereencompassed in the regular records destruction program. So I think the answerto your question is probably yes." (Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)7 Even prior to the destruction of documents, the MKULTRA records were farfrom complete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963:"Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statementsthat might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantialportion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principalofficers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures."(G Report on MKULTRA, p. 23.)
405tions"."8 Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding of documentsin support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures,were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dullesapproved MKULTRA, noting that security considerations precludedhandling the project through usual contractual agreements.Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the InspectorGeneral and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which resultedfrom the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right toaudit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had beenunable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Anotherfirm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would assure"proper accountability" in use of government funds with theresult that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated bygrants or allowable under usual contract relationship." " The entireMKULTRA arrangement was condemned for having administrativelines which were unclear, overly permissive controls, and irresponsiblesupervision.The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits:led us to see MKULTRA as frequently having provided adevice to escape normal administrative controls for researchthat is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practicesthat produce gross administrative failures, as having permittedthe establishment of special relationships with unreliableorganizations on an unacceptable basis, and as havingproduced, on at least one occasion, a cavalier treatment of abona fide contracting organization.While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanismsfor handling sensitive projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch wrotethat "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handlingsuch special projects should be spelled out in advance so that diversionfrom normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highlysensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal controlmechanisms, such waivers should not be extended to less sensitiveoperations. Moreover, only those regulations which would endangersecurity should be waived; to waive regulations generally wouldresult in highly sensitive and controversial projects having looserrather than stricter administrative controls. MKNAOMI, the FortDetrick CIA project for research and development of chemical andbiological agents, provides another example where efforts to protectthe security of agency activties overwhelmed administrative controls.No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shellfishtoxin were kept, "because of the sensitivity of the area and thedesire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless." 81 The11 Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab. A, p. 2.- Memorandum from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/8/63, as quoted in memorandumfrom Chief, Audit Branch.' The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions, because of theimportance of such decisions, should require the personal approval of the DeputyDirector of Central Intelligence on an inidividual case basis. Present CIA policyis that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.Sidney Gottlieb testimony, 10/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 51.sx
- Page 2:
PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM
- Page 5:
CONTESTSStatements of:PageAdmiral S
- Page 10 and 11:
destruction of MKULTRA files in 197
- Page 12 and 13:
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 1
- Page 14 and 15:
The material in 1975 was also spars
- Page 16 and 17:
Tenth, there are six subprojects on
- Page 18 and 19:
or damage to their reputations whic
- Page 20 and 21:
In early June, however, he discover
- Page 22 and 23:
17You know, much of the research wh
- Page 24 and 25:
efore, and I am hopeful we can get
- Page 26 and 27:
Counsel's opinion was that this was
- Page 28 and 29:
Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were
- Page 30 and 31:
these were going on, especially whe
- Page 32 and 33:
Only a handful of cases in which sc
- Page 34 and 35:
29another threatened to kill on sig
- Page 36 and 37:
Rarely has a drug interrogation inv
- Page 38 and 39: 33REFERENCES1. Adams, E. Barbiturat
- Page 40 and 41: of Central Intelligence, subproject
- Page 42 and 43: for his own particular reasons not
- Page 44 and 45: projects will be completely deniabl
- Page 46 and 47: with that, but apparently for at le
- Page 48 and 49: Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there
- Page 50 and 51: Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about
- Page 52 and 53: who, if either of us, should get in
- Page 54 and 55: and the new documentation and the n
- Page 56 and 57: Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittin
- Page 58 and 59: of those programs and your name is
- Page 60 and 61: Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.Senator KENNEDY. W
- Page 62 and 63: And among other things, we decided
- Page 64 and 65: Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not in
- Page 66 and 67: Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want
- Page 68 and 69: Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I ha
- Page 70 and 71: 386ties would have serious repercus
- Page 72 and 73: 388that no damage was done to indiv
- Page 74 and 75: 390funding mechanism for highly sen
- Page 76 and 77: 72392subjects-the CIA had developed
- Page 78 and 79: 394Although the CIA recognized thes
- Page 80 and 81: 396proval of his immediate supervis
- Page 82 and 83: 398Immediately after finding that O
- Page 84 and 85: 400"observe the behavior of unwitti
- Page 86 and 87: 402If one grants the validity of th
- Page 90 and 91: 86406result was that the Agency had
- Page 92 and 93: 88- 408In 1963, the Inspector Gener
- Page 94 and 95: 90410QKHILLTOP, another group desig
- Page 96 and 97: 4121. Scope of TestingBetween 1955
- Page 98 and 99: 414general lack of interagency comm
- Page 100 and 101: 416For the next 28 minutes, the sub
- Page 102 and 103: 418This problem was compounded by t
- Page 104 and 105: 420The subsequent adoption of this
- Page 106 and 107: 422apparent unwillingness on the pa
- Page 108 and 109: 104u E T: Request for Guidance on H
- Page 110 and 111: The Didctor of Central Intelligence
- Page 112 and 113: 109APPENDIX CDOCUMENTS REFERRING TO
- Page 114 and 115: 111PROPOSAL.Objective:To study the
- Page 116 and 117: 113date -J.UN -In' 3.2 Lugo"tJ,55MI
- Page 118 and 119: 115r urel avesaio'hi n tvopezied--
- Page 120 and 121: 117The present ± vdstigation is co
- Page 122 and 123: 11925 AuguSt 1955MERANDUM FOR:SUBJE
- Page 124 and 125: 121cherce c ontir.. the ro,:ect. if
- Page 126 and 127: 1235 May 1955A "-ticn of the 1Rosec
- Page 128 and 129: 125The propozed facilityoj2S~ffara
- Page 130 and 131: ads for tihs purpose through the co
- Page 132 and 133: 663, dated 26 August 1954, funds ar
- Page 134 and 135: 131.VI.Comments by the Office of Ge
- Page 136 and 137: 133Ll-rezlh l-te fle on*~tA Subproj
- Page 138 and 139:
135II.Background of theTh was incor
- Page 140 and 141:
137VI.Difficulties Faced by TSS.It
- Page 142 and 143:
139morale booster.(e)Human patients
- Page 144 and 145:
141XI.Resultant Financial Saving.Th
- Page 146 and 147:
143length about his -- "pcrimear.*
- Page 148 and 149:
Mr.Page Twodelay this matter for a
- Page 150 and 151:
147rubjects varies from t::.0-ty' '
- Page 152 and 153:
149tetrhr;eocrnnabbol nctata Ceriva
- Page 154 and 155:
151DRAPT/a"o30 January 1961V2240RAN
- Page 156 and 157:
153EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT:
- Page 158 and 159:
1551MMAManuman re' rsCOR-sUM FORt.
- Page 160 and 161:
1571960The researci to be undertake
- Page 162 and 163:
159.MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconnSUBJEC
- Page 164 and 165:
161MMORANDM FOR: TE MODSUBJECTConti
- Page 166 and 167:
163MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD o LtSU
- Page 168 and 169:
165SUBJECT:Request for Support of R
- Page 170 and 171:
1671.1 Trotter. W. defies brain con
- Page 172 and 173:
MATERIAL FOR THE RECORDMKSEARCH. OF
- Page 174:
171QKHILLTOP DEFINITIONQKHILLTOP wa