396proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS northe DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olsonparticipated.35According to Gottlieb. 3 6 a "very small dose" of LSD was placed ina bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday,November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lashbrook.All but two of the SOD participants received LSD. One didnot drink; the other had a heart condition. 3 7 About twenty minutesafter they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb informed the other participantsthat they had received LSD.Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," heobserved nothing unusual in Olson's behavior. 3 7a Once the experimentwas underway, Gottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect onthe group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and theycould not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation."The meeting continued until about 1:00 a.m., when the participantsretired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others,complained of "wakefulness" during the night. 3 8 According to Gottliebon Friday morning "aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observednothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation, or general behavior."39 Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" atbreakfast, but that he "did not consider this to be abnormal under thecircumstances." 40c. The Treatment.-The following Monday, November 23, Olsonwas waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m. For thenext two days Olson's friends and family attempted to reassure hinand help him "snap out" of what appeared to be a serious depression.On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long con-Dr. Gottlieb testified that "given the information we knew up to this time,and based on a lot of our own self-administration, we thought it was a fairlybenign substance in terms of potential harm." This is in conflict not only with 'Mr.Helms' statement but also with material which had been supplied to the TechnicalServices Staff. In one long memorandum on current research with LSD whichwas supplied to TSD, Henry Beecher described the dangers involved with suchresearch in a prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothlandcame when I raised the question as to any accidents which had arisen fromthe use of LSD-25. He said in a very positive way, 'none.' As it turned outthis answer could be called overly positive, for later on in the evening I wasdiscussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl, Jr., a psychiatrist in Bleulera'sClinic in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl, when askedthe same question, replied, 'yes,' and added spontaneously, 'there is a caseProfessor Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who had beensubject to depression to some extent took LSD-25 in an experiment and becameseverely and suddenly depressed and committed suicide three weeks later.While the connection is not definite, common knowledge of this could hardlyhave allowed the positive statement Rothland permitted himself. This case isa warning to us to avoid engaging subjects who are depressed, or who have beensubject to depression.' " Dr. Gottlieb testified that he had no recollection ofeither the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney Gottlieb testimony,10/19/75, p. 78.)" Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record, 11/28/53, p. 2.' Lashbrook (staff summary), 7/19/75, p. 3."a Gottlieb Memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 2.Edwards memorandum, 11/28/53, p. 3.Gottlieb memorandum. 12/7/53, p. 3.' 0 Ruwet memorandum, p. 3.
397versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson wasdesirable."1Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olsonwas in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention." 42Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwetto bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded toWashington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New Yorkat about 2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologistpracticing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychiatry,but was associated with research projects supported indirectlyby the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closelyin the early 1950s. 4 3 Since Olson needed medical help, they turned toDr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who was experiencedwith LSD and cleared by the CIA.Ruwet, Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days ofconsultations with Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, thethree flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgivingwith his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that hewas afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion, it was decidedthat Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York, and thatRuwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to Mrs. Olson ."Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, againfor consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in aLong Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city withAbramson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreedthat Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at aninstitution closer to his home. 4 5d. The Death.-Because they could not obtain air transportation fora return trip on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservationsfor Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Betweenthe time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television,visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner.According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoythe entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed,and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment." 46After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for aboutan hour, and at 11:00, Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that"he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] cameto New York." " Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wakethem in the morning. At approximately 2:30 a.m. Saturday, November28, Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "crash of glass." In hisreport on the incident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed throughthe closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his deathfrom the window of our room on the 10th floor." 48"Ibid., p. 4.' 2 Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 1.43 Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2." Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.4 Abramson memorandum, 12/4/53.* Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.7 Ibid., p. 4.0 Ibid.96-408 0 - 77 - 6
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PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM
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CONTESTSStatements of:PageAdmiral S
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destruction of MKULTRA files in 197
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and harassment substances (pp. 4, 1
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The material in 1975 was also spars
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Tenth, there are six subprojects on
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or damage to their reputations whic
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In early June, however, he discover
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17You know, much of the research wh
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efore, and I am hopeful we can get
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Counsel's opinion was that this was
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Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were
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- Page 34 and 35: 29another threatened to kill on sig
- Page 36 and 37: Rarely has a drug interrogation inv
- Page 38 and 39: 33REFERENCES1. Adams, E. Barbiturat
- Page 40 and 41: of Central Intelligence, subproject
- Page 42 and 43: for his own particular reasons not
- Page 44 and 45: projects will be completely deniabl
- Page 46 and 47: with that, but apparently for at le
- Page 48 and 49: Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there
- Page 50 and 51: Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about
- Page 52 and 53: who, if either of us, should get in
- Page 54 and 55: and the new documentation and the n
- Page 56 and 57: Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittin
- Page 58 and 59: of those programs and your name is
- Page 60 and 61: Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.Senator KENNEDY. W
- Page 62 and 63: And among other things, we decided
- Page 64 and 65: Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not in
- Page 66 and 67: Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want
- Page 68 and 69: Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I ha
- Page 70 and 71: 386ties would have serious repercus
- Page 72 and 73: 388that no damage was done to indiv
- Page 74 and 75: 390funding mechanism for highly sen
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- Page 78 and 79: 394Although the CIA recognized thes
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- Page 84 and 85: 400"observe the behavior of unwitti
- Page 86 and 87: 402If one grants the validity of th
- Page 88 and 89: 84404well, so that anybody who assi
- Page 90 and 91: 86406result was that the Agency had
- Page 92 and 93: 88- 408In 1963, the Inspector Gener
- Page 94 and 95: 90410QKHILLTOP, another group desig
- Page 96 and 97: 4121. Scope of TestingBetween 1955
- Page 98 and 99: 414general lack of interagency comm
- Page 100 and 101: 416For the next 28 minutes, the sub
- Page 102 and 103: 418This problem was compounded by t
- Page 104 and 105: 420The subsequent adoption of this
- Page 106 and 107: 422apparent unwillingness on the pa
- Page 108 and 109: 104u E T: Request for Guidance on H
- Page 110 and 111: The Didctor of Central Intelligence
- Page 112 and 113: 109APPENDIX CDOCUMENTS REFERRING TO
- Page 114 and 115: 111PROPOSAL.Objective:To study the
- Page 116 and 117: 113date -J.UN -In' 3.2 Lugo"tJ,55MI
- Page 118 and 119: 115r urel avesaio'hi n tvopezied--
- Page 120 and 121: 117The present ± vdstigation is co
- Page 122 and 123: 11925 AuguSt 1955MERANDUM FOR:SUBJE
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ads for tihs purpose through the co
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663, dated 26 August 1954, funds ar
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131.VI.Comments by the Office of Ge
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133Ll-rezlh l-te fle on*~tA Subproj
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135II.Background of theTh was incor
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137VI.Difficulties Faced by TSS.It
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139morale booster.(e)Human patients
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141XI.Resultant Financial Saving.Th
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143length about his -- "pcrimear.*
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Mr.Page Twodelay this matter for a
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147rubjects varies from t::.0-ty' '
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149tetrhr;eocrnnabbol nctata Ceriva
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151DRAPT/a"o30 January 1961V2240RAN
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153EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT:
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1551MMAManuman re' rsCOR-sUM FORt.
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1571960The researci to be undertake
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159.MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconnSUBJEC
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161MMORANDM FOR: TE MODSUBJECTConti
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163MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD o LtSU
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165SUBJECT:Request for Support of R
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1671.1 Trotter. W. defies brain con
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MATERIAL FOR THE RECORDMKSEARCH. OF
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171QKHILLTOP DEFINITIONQKHILLTOP wa