398Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lashbrooktelephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of the incident.4 " Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson's deathat approximately 2:45 a.m. 50 Lashbrook then called the hotel deskand reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook calledAbramson and informed him of the occurrence. Abramson told Lashbrookhe "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely," but laterchanged his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook.5'Shortly thereafter, uniformed police officers and some hotel employeescame to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook told the police he didn'tknow why Olson had committed suicide, but he did know that Olson"suffered from ulcers." 65e. The Aftermath.-Following Dr. Olson's death, the CIA madea substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits,but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding hisdemise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent thedeath being connected with the CIA, and supplied complete cover forLashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret.After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investigationof the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investigation,the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitudeon the part of TSS representatives to the way this experimentwas conducted and the remarks that this is just one ofthe risks running with scientific experimentation. I do noteliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, especiallywhen human health or life is at stake, that at least theprudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to mini-. mize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpablenegligence. The actions of the various individuals concernedafter effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifestalso revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonableprecautions."As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personalletter to the Chief of Technical Oneiations of the Technical ServicesStaff who had approved the experiment criticizing him for "poorjudgment... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwittingbasis and without proximate medical safeguards." 54 Dulles also senta letter to Dr. Gotilieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the TechifiicalServices Staff, criticizing him for recommending the "unwittingapplication of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give sufficientemphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper considerationof the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."CTA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.Ruwet Memorandum, p. 11.CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.Z2 Ibid.Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Inspector General. 1/4/54." Memorandum from DCI to Chief, Technical Opeiutions, TSS, 2/12/54.7 Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54.
79399The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read andreturned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the DeputyDirector of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to informthe individuals that: "These are not reprimands and no personnelfile notation are being made." 5Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized themas such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participationin the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have any apparenteffect on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals involved.3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unwitting Non-Volunteer Human Subjects by the CIA After the Death of Dr.OlsonThe death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the time,as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances.It might be argued that LSD was thought to be benign.After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious administrationof LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated 11 aproject involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to nonvolunteerhuman subjects. This program exposed numerous individualsin the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without theirinformed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessaryfollow-up to determine any long-term effects.Prior to the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligencehad approved MKULTRA, a research program designed to developa "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agentmaterials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms, thenADDP, wrote the Director that:we intend to investigate the development of a chemical materialwhich causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state,the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predictedfor each individual. This material could potentially aid indiscrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implantingsuggestions and other forms of mental control.5sOn February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central IntelligenceAgency wrote TSS officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" inadministering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximatemedical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack of "proper considerationof the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."59 On the same day, the Inspector General reviewed a reporton Subproject Number 3 of MKULTRA, in which the same TSSofficers who had just received letters from the Director were quotedas stating that one of the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to6 Note from DDCI to Richard Helms, 2/13/54." The 1963 IG Report, which described the project involving the surreptitiousadministration of LSD, placed the project beginning in 1955. Other CIA documentsreveal that it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA hastold the Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the experiment whichled to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project." Memorandum from ADDP items to DOI Dulles, 4/3/53, tab A, p. 2.0 Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54; and memorandum fromDCI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
- Page 2:
PROJECT MKIULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM
- Page 5:
CONTESTSStatements of:PageAdmiral S
- Page 10 and 11:
destruction of MKULTRA files in 197
- Page 12 and 13:
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 1
- Page 14 and 15:
The material in 1975 was also spars
- Page 16 and 17:
Tenth, there are six subprojects on
- Page 18 and 19:
or damage to their reputations whic
- Page 20 and 21:
In early June, however, he discover
- Page 22 and 23:
17You know, much of the research wh
- Page 24 and 25:
efore, and I am hopeful we can get
- Page 26 and 27:
Counsel's opinion was that this was
- Page 28 and 29:
Senator HUDDLESTON. But if it were
- Page 30 and 31:
these were going on, especially whe
- Page 32 and 33: Only a handful of cases in which sc
- Page 34 and 35: 29another threatened to kill on sig
- Page 36 and 37: Rarely has a drug interrogation inv
- Page 38 and 39: 33REFERENCES1. Adams, E. Barbiturat
- Page 40 and 41: of Central Intelligence, subproject
- Page 42 and 43: for his own particular reasons not
- Page 44 and 45: projects will be completely deniabl
- Page 46 and 47: with that, but apparently for at le
- Page 48 and 49: Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there
- Page 50 and 51: Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about
- Page 52 and 53: who, if either of us, should get in
- Page 54 and 55: and the new documentation and the n
- Page 56 and 57: Senator INoUYE. And Mr. John Gittin
- Page 58 and 59: of those programs and your name is
- Page 60 and 61: Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.Senator KENNEDY. W
- Page 62 and 63: And among other things, we decided
- Page 64 and 65: Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not in
- Page 66 and 67: Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want
- Page 68 and 69: Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I ha
- Page 70 and 71: 386ties would have serious repercus
- Page 72 and 73: 388that no damage was done to indiv
- Page 74 and 75: 390funding mechanism for highly sen
- Page 76 and 77: 72392subjects-the CIA had developed
- Page 78 and 79: 394Although the CIA recognized thes
- Page 80 and 81: 396proval of his immediate supervis
- Page 84 and 85: 400"observe the behavior of unwitti
- Page 86 and 87: 402If one grants the validity of th
- Page 88 and 89: 84404well, so that anybody who assi
- Page 90 and 91: 86406result was that the Agency had
- Page 92 and 93: 88- 408In 1963, the Inspector Gener
- Page 94 and 95: 90410QKHILLTOP, another group desig
- Page 96 and 97: 4121. Scope of TestingBetween 1955
- Page 98 and 99: 414general lack of interagency comm
- Page 100 and 101: 416For the next 28 minutes, the sub
- Page 102 and 103: 418This problem was compounded by t
- Page 104 and 105: 420The subsequent adoption of this
- Page 106 and 107: 422apparent unwillingness on the pa
- Page 108 and 109: 104u E T: Request for Guidance on H
- Page 110 and 111: The Didctor of Central Intelligence
- Page 112 and 113: 109APPENDIX CDOCUMENTS REFERRING TO
- Page 114 and 115: 111PROPOSAL.Objective:To study the
- Page 116 and 117: 113date -J.UN -In' 3.2 Lugo"tJ,55MI
- Page 118 and 119: 115r urel avesaio'hi n tvopezied--
- Page 120 and 121: 117The present ± vdstigation is co
- Page 122 and 123: 11925 AuguSt 1955MERANDUM FOR:SUBJE
- Page 124 and 125: 121cherce c ontir.. the ro,:ect. if
- Page 126 and 127: 1235 May 1955A "-ticn of the 1Rosec
- Page 128 and 129: 125The propozed facilityoj2S~ffara
- Page 130 and 131: ads for tihs purpose through the co
- Page 132 and 133:
663, dated 26 August 1954, funds ar
- Page 134 and 135:
131.VI.Comments by the Office of Ge
- Page 136 and 137:
133Ll-rezlh l-te fle on*~tA Subproj
- Page 138 and 139:
135II.Background of theTh was incor
- Page 140 and 141:
137VI.Difficulties Faced by TSS.It
- Page 142 and 143:
139morale booster.(e)Human patients
- Page 144 and 145:
141XI.Resultant Financial Saving.Th
- Page 146 and 147:
143length about his -- "pcrimear.*
- Page 148 and 149:
Mr.Page Twodelay this matter for a
- Page 150 and 151:
147rubjects varies from t::.0-ty' '
- Page 152 and 153:
149tetrhr;eocrnnabbol nctata Ceriva
- Page 154 and 155:
151DRAPT/a"o30 January 1961V2240RAN
- Page 156 and 157:
153EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT:
- Page 158 and 159:
1551MMAManuman re' rsCOR-sUM FORt.
- Page 160 and 161:
1571960The researci to be undertake
- Page 162 and 163:
159.MEMORANDUM FOR: THtfEconnSUBJEC
- Page 164 and 165:
161MMORANDM FOR: TE MODSUBJECTConti
- Page 166 and 167:
163MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD o LtSU
- Page 168 and 169:
165SUBJECT:Request for Support of R
- Page 170 and 171:
1671.1 Trotter. W. defies brain con
- Page 172 and 173:
MATERIAL FOR THE RECORDMKSEARCH. OF
- Page 174:
171QKHILLTOP DEFINITIONQKHILLTOP wa