hearing

90410QKHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate research inthis area also had little success. The group met infrequently-onlytwice a year-and little specific information was exchanged. 9Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure toshare information,95 but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSDofficer stated that the Office of Medical Services simply wasn't "particularlyinterested in what we were doing" and never sought suchinformation.6 On the other hand, a representative of the Office ofMedical Services consistently sought to have medical personnel participatein the use of chemical and biological agents suggested thatTSD did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to preventtheir involvement.Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office ofSecurity, which had been assigned responsibility for direction ofARTICHOKE, consistently sought to bring TSD operations involvingpsychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. TheOffice of Medical Services sought to have OMS physicians advise andparticipate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector Generaldescribed it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extentof authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, overthe activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into the medicalfield," and which are conducted by TSD "without seeking the priorapproval of the Chief, Medical Staff, and often without informinghim of their nature and extent." 97As was noted previously, because the projects and programs ofTSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by theDDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activitiesby the Medical Staff :It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to theChief, Medical Staff, what, in effect, would be authority overclandestine operations. Furthermore, some of the activitiesof Chemical Division are not only unorthodox but unethicaland sometimes illegal. The DDP is in a better position toevaluate the justification for such operations than the Chief,Medical Staff .9 [Emphasis added.]Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for"evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and because theknowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit activitieswould have serious repercussions in political and diplomaticcircles," the IG recommended that the Director of Security be fullyadvised of TSD's activities in these areas.Even after the Inspector General's Report of 1957, the compartmentationand jurisdictional conflict continued. They may have had a sub-The one set of minutes from a QKHILLTOP meeting indicated that individualsin the Office of Medical Services stressed the need for more contact.' When asked why information on the surreptitious administration of LSI)was not presented to the ARTICHOKE committee, Dr. Gottlieb responded: "Iimagine the only reason would have been a concern for broadening the awarenessof its existence."'IA ifficer. 11/21/75. p. 14.IG Survey of TS), 1957. p. 217.0a Ibid.