100Dermot KeoghHad Lemass and other senior politicians been more experienced in the ways <strong>of</strong>EEC affairs, there would have been less need to exhibit concern. Whitaker's strategy<strong>of</strong> “dignified calm”, outlined on 5 March, was a pru<strong>de</strong>nt one. But it was difficultto follow when the government nee<strong>de</strong>d a “success” in Europe in or<strong>de</strong>r to forestallfurther domestic political criticism <strong>of</strong> its performance. Convinced that hecould overcome the remaining doubts concerning the Irish application in the minds<strong>of</strong> the foreign ministers <strong>of</strong> the Six <strong>–</strong> had not his trip to Brussels on 18 January hadan impact <strong>–</strong> the Taoiseach now looked favourably on the suggestion <strong>of</strong> a tour <strong>of</strong> the<strong>European</strong> capitals. Lemass, who was going to the opening <strong>of</strong> the Second VaticanCouncil on 11 October, saw that as an opportunity to extend his trip to visit thecapitals <strong>of</strong> the Six. That was a poor pretence.Space does not allow a <strong>de</strong>tailed explanation <strong>of</strong> Lemass's tour <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> thecapitals. He visited Brussels, Rome, Paris and Bonn. Upon his return to Dublin,Lemass knew that the Six would agree on the admission <strong>of</strong> Ireland to negotiations.But he was also aware that formal talks would not begin with Brussels until negotiationshad first been conclu<strong>de</strong>d with Britain. In the final week in October, theCouncil agreed in Brussels to the opening <strong>of</strong> negotiations on the Irish application ata date to be fixed by agreement with Dublin and the governments <strong>of</strong> the Six.Lemass gave that news to Dáil Éireann on 30 October. 84 While he faced a series <strong>of</strong>questions from the opposition, he refused to give much <strong>de</strong>tail about his trips to thecapitals <strong>of</strong> the Six. 85 He remained, as ever, economical with his information. 86Lemass recor<strong>de</strong>d the goodwill shown to the Irish application by everyone withwhom he had come in contact. Because <strong>of</strong> the absolute priority which the Six hadaccor<strong>de</strong>d the British application it was thus unlikely that substantive negotiationswith Dublin would begin for “some months”. Failure <strong>of</strong> the British applicationwould “create an entirely new situation for all concerned and one about which itwould be impossible to make any useful conjecture” at that time. When pressed byDillon, Lemass speculated that British accession might occur on 1 January 1964. 87A meeting <strong>of</strong> <strong>de</strong>partmental secretaries reviewed the Irish position on 13 November.Cremin, addressing a number <strong>of</strong> the remaining problems, said that Britain wasIreland's main market, and he gained the impression from the French foreign minister’sremarks that he inten<strong>de</strong>d to write <strong>of</strong>f the Six as a market for Irish exports. Creminfelt that viewpoint would come up again later. He also told his fellow secretariesthat A<strong>de</strong>nauer had been extremely friendly, giving a dinner in honour <strong>of</strong> theTaoiseach and attending the dinner given by the Taoiseach. The reception accor<strong>de</strong>dthe Taoiseach in all the countries had been very friendly. Nowhere was there anyindication that some form <strong>of</strong> preferential association was contemplated for Ireland.The only critical note was that soun<strong>de</strong>d by Sig. Cattani [Secretary General <strong>of</strong> the84. Dáil Debates, Vol. 197, Col. 3, 30 October 1962.85. Questions had been put down by the lea<strong>de</strong>r <strong>of</strong> Fine Gael, James Dillon, by three members <strong>of</strong> the LabourParty, Patrick Corish, William Norton and Seán Dunne, and by Noel Browne and Jack McQuillan.86. Dáil <strong>de</strong>bates, Vol. 197, Col. 3, 30 October 1962.87. Dáil Debates, Vol. 197, Cols. 3-4, 30 October 1962.
The Diplomacy <strong>of</strong> ‘dignified calm’ 101Italian Foreign Ministry] who, although well disposed, was inclined to look at mattersfrom the Community viewpoint and seemed to say that Irish entry to the Communitywas not as simple a matter as his Italian colleagues appeared to think. Creminad<strong>de</strong>d that he had heard from Dutch sources that Hallstein had said that it wasnot clear what would happen to other countries besi<strong>de</strong>s Britain. Cremin felt thatthat seemed to be a retreat from what he had previously said to the Taoiseach.However, having achieved their medium term objective, it was a question <strong>of</strong>watching and awaiting the outcome <strong>of</strong> the British negotiations. In January 1963, <strong>de</strong>Gaulle's veto on British entry put Irish membership out <strong>of</strong> reach.ConclusionIt would take another ten years before Ireland was accepted as a member <strong>of</strong> the<strong>European</strong> Economic Community. Lemass, who was in <strong>de</strong>clining health, resignedsud<strong>de</strong>nly in 1966 at the age <strong>of</strong> 67. Only Taoiseach for seven years, he did not live towitness Ireland's admission to the EEC. He retired from Dáil Éireann in 1969 anddied in 1971. Dr Whitaker wrote <strong>of</strong> him appreciatively some years later:“One can, however, safely assert that this pragmatic nationalist, who had erected thehigh tariff wall in the 1930s to shelter Ireland's infant industry, would have beenhappy to see it razed to the ground in return for the benefits to Ireland <strong>of</strong> membership<strong>of</strong> the Community. He would have been gratified that many <strong>of</strong> the ‘infants’ werestrong enough to make their way against Continental as well as British competitors.”88The Irish Times in an editorial <strong>de</strong>scribed Seán Lemass at the time <strong>of</strong> his <strong>de</strong>ath as“a mould breaker and a mould maker”. 89 While he had found it hard to abandon thesafe shores <strong>of</strong> protectionism, Lemass was not so rigid as to be unable to evaluatethe opportunities which membership <strong>of</strong> the EEC <strong>of</strong>fered Ireland. While the 1962application failed, it signalled the <strong>de</strong>ath knell <strong>of</strong> the policy <strong>of</strong> protectionism,marked the consolidation <strong>of</strong> Monnet-style rational social and economic planning,and proved to be an irrevocable commitment to the achievement <strong>of</strong> Irish membership<strong>of</strong> the EEC. The political and administrative experience gained in handling the1962 application, finally, <strong>de</strong>monstrated the pru<strong>de</strong>nce <strong>of</strong> the diplomacy <strong>of</strong> “dignifiedcalm” <strong>–</strong> a diplomatic style more <strong>of</strong>ten aspired to than practised by Dublin during1962. That earlier experience provi<strong>de</strong>d a new generation <strong>of</strong> diplomats and veteransalike with a valuable case study by which they could measure tactics and performancewhen, less than a <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong> later, they negotiated Irish entry into the EEC.Dermot Keogh88. T. K. WHITAKER, Interests, p. 77.89. The Irish Times, 12 May 1971.