Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Association or Trade Agreement? 113Rome. 29 The Minister of Commerce had no trouble in declaring that a specific policytowards the EEC was not urgent as long as means existed to offset the discriminationestablished by the Treaty. 30 Unfortunately for the Spanish, GATT was of noassistance and effective discrimination could no longer be avoided after 1961 whenthe drive pressure towards common external tariff levels started. It was then, maybefor the very first time, that the Spanish authorities came to perceive the EEC ashaving a direct and immediate negative impact on Spanish export trade. Althoughthis was not the case in the short term, the important aspect is that the Spanishauthorities believed it was so.Oranges could again serve to show the disturbing horizon created by the implementationof a common tariff wall by those countries that purchased seventy-twoper cent of Spain's exports of this commodity in 1961, although similar casesoccurred for other horticultural products such as wine and olive oil. Oranges fromoutside the EEC area were to be subject to twenty per cent ad valorem dutiesbetween 1 October and 14 March and fifteen per cent during the rest of the year.This situation meant an increase in the levels of tariff protection applying in Spain'smain export market for oranges and the like, i.e., six per cent throughout the year inthe Federal Republic of Germany. 31 The common tariff would increase threefoldthe duty on half of Spain's orange exports to the Six. The only alleviation concernedFrance, where tariff duties were – according to the period of the year considered– between twenty and thirty-five per cent. Lower duties on exports toFrance, despite the fact that it took one third of Spain's orange exports to the Six,could not be considered as compensation for the damage done in the German market.In addition, France offered preferential access to the increasing orange productionof North Africa to the detriment of Spain. A common external tariff impliedthat Spain had to renounce all exemptions previously reached through bilateraldealings and start bargaining new concessions with the EEC as a whole fromscratch. This was a dramatic prospect if consideration is given to the fact that citrusfruit exports to the Six plus those other markets in the process of either accession toor association with the EEC amounted, according to the year, to between twentyand twenty-five per cent of total foreign currency earned through exportation. 3229. At the time of the first tariff cuts following the Treaty of Rome, MAE, Leg. 5631, exp. 2: CommercialCounsellor to Minister Ullastres, “Estudio preliminar para un eventual acercamiento de Españaal Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT)”, Bern, 26 January 1959. Atthe time the Six decided to accelerate the customs union process. Leg. 9279, exp- 7: “Nota para elSeñor Subsecretario. Presencia de España en la XVI sesión del GATT (Ginebra 16 de mayo de1960)” by the Director of Economic Cooperation Organisations, 7 April 1960. At the time of thetariff cuts of 1961, Leg. 10388, exp. 4: Minister Castiella to Consul in Geneva, 16 January.30. MAE, Leg. 6415, exp. 25: Note for the Under-Secretary of International Oraganisations at the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, “Declaraciones del Ministro de Comercio sobre las negociaciones tarifariascon el GATT y el Mercado Común en la Asamblea de las Cámeras de Comercio, Industria y Navegaciónde España”, 7 November 1961.31. MAE, Leg. 6417, exp. 14: “Posible resultado negativo de las peticiones de los importadores de naranjasde la C.E.E.”, Spanish Mission to the EEC, Brussels, 12 December 1961.32. For relevant documentation on the various aspects mentioned so far in this section, MAE, Leg. 5911,exps. 1 and 2; Leg. 6417, exps. 12-14; and Leg. 6916, exp. 6.