Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'
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46Markus Schulteslowly until 1959, catch up to the more “normal” level <strong>of</strong> import-values from theEFTA members which started <strong>of</strong>f from a much higher level and with a steeper1953-58 trend.ConclusionThe conclusion would be yet again that for tra<strong>de</strong> with EFTA the foundation <strong>of</strong> thetwo competing trading blocs did not seem to matter for German export performance,whereas the lowering <strong>of</strong> internal tariffs among EEC members helped realise ahuge potential for tra<strong>de</strong> mainly among the three larger economies <strong>of</strong> the EEC,France, Italy and Germany. As far as industrial interest and pressure is concerned,the statistical evi<strong>de</strong>nce for machinery exports shows that there were no tangiblelosses at all, nor any visible opportunity costs. The prospects for the Germanmachinery, chemical and electrical engineering industries at the end <strong>of</strong> the 1950swere clear: capturing the huge and previously protected Italian and French markets,while hoping to keep the strong presence on the markets <strong>of</strong> the Seven. Protectiveinterests on the whole did not exist in these sectors. The fears that the divisionsbetween the EEC and the Seven after the failure <strong>of</strong> the Maudling negotiationsmight negatively affect German export interests in Europe outsi<strong>de</strong> the EEC did notmaterialise. The stagnation in machinery exports from 1958 to 1960 equally concernedEEC and EFTA markets and had thus nothing to do with the coming intoeffect <strong>of</strong> the EEC but more probably with a general slowdown in economic activityin 1958 which in turn might have negatively affected investment <strong>de</strong>cisions for sometime hitting capital goods sales har<strong>de</strong>r than those in other sectors.The Potential Losers from the FTA and British Accession.Textiles, Non-ferrous Metals and Paper IndustriesThe textile industry and the non-ferrous metals sector were the most vociferouswhen it came to criticising the free tra<strong>de</strong> area project and the planned British accesionto the EEC. They predicted the most dire consequences should either <strong>of</strong> thesearrangements come about. The same is true for the non-ferrous metal products sector,the paper and paper product industries, as well as for timber and timberprocessing and a number <strong>of</strong> sectors whose fears and complaints with regard to thenegotiations which have been mentioned. All <strong>of</strong> these sectors had specific competitorsin mind when setting out to protest against the Europe-wi<strong>de</strong> free tra<strong>de</strong> area orany similar arrangement. For the non-ferrous metal industry, for timber, wood pulp,paper and paper product producers in the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic, competition fromScandinavia, mainly from Norway, but also from Austria was seen as a seriousthreat which, in their view, could endanger the existence <strong>of</strong> whole industries. Forthe textile industry the main competitors were India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and Sri