Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 77tled to negotiate and sign an agreement with a third country, notably in the Easternblock. Problems could arise if the common commercial policy was used for politicalpurposes, particularly against the Soviet block. 45The Swedish government expected that the Six would respect the delimitationmade necessary by neutrality, as they respected the efforts aimed at bringing aboutpolitical unity by the Six, even though Sweden could not herself participate inthem. There were, however, suspicions that Sweden advanced arguments connectedwith the policy of neutrality for purely economic motivations. In the Swedish presentationsin the Council of Ministers on July 28, Gunnar Lange therefore had toemphasise that “it is not, and has never been, the intention of the Swedish Governmentto try to dilute, slow down or otherwise interfere with this political process.”He furthermore rejected accusations that Sweden was trying to make the best ofboth worlds, by assuring his audience that Sweden did not intend to use the neutralityargument to gain economic advantages. The Swedish government aimed at “anextensive, close and durable economic relationship with the Community...”. Therewere, however, a few important features of membership which were not compatiblewith the policy of neutrality, and Lange mentioned three exemptions which wouldbe required. Firstly came trade policy towards third countries. Although Swedenwas prepared to co-ordinate her tariff and trade policy closely with that of the Community,she would have to keep “a certain liberty of action” and to reserve theauthority to negotiate and sign agreements with third countries in her name. Thesecond point related to the safeguard of certain supplies vital in wartime, i.e. inaddition to war materials certain supplies of pharmaceuticals and vital foodstuffs.Thirdly, Sweden needed to be able to take, or abstain from, measures according tothe requirements of neutrality. This might involve the temporary, complete or partial,suspension of the agreement, if not its denunciation. Finally, the institutionalarrangements should be such as to safeguard “both the integrity of the Communityand the identity of the associate.” 46The neutrals did not succeed in convincing the Six that their attitudes towardsassociation were reasonable and constructive. Particularly the demand for an optoutclause together with the piecemeal application of the common external tariffseemed to be thoroughly incompatible with the Community idea. While the Austrianposition seems to have been understood, the Six did not see why Swedenshould not accept the Treaty of Rome as a full member. 47In this awkward situation the Swedish Government again resorted to the Finlandargument when explaining their foreign policy to the French and the Americans.It was underlined that Swedish neutrality was not only good for Sweden, but45. PRO, FO 371, vol. 164705 (615/144) Everson to FO, Stockholm, March 26, 1962; vol. 164709(615/240) Meeting with Officials from the Three Neutral Members of EFTA, May 3-4, 1962. Noteby Foreign Office.46. Speech by the Minister of Commerce before the EEC Council of Ministers; 28th July, in Documents ...1962, pp. 146-155.47. This was noted by the British, and e.g. the First Secretary of the British delegation to the BrusselsConference, Christopher Audland, openly expressed that he shared the view of the Six, EFTA Archives,Ray Colegate to Frank Figgures, Brussels, October 14, 1962.