Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

118Fernando GuiraoMadrid was perfectly aware of the political problems lying ahead. 44 Therefore,it tried to avoid stimulating further interference with its plans. Although it wasobvious that the Franco regime could not fully accept the goals set out in the Treatyof Rome, Minister Castiella requested his ambassadors to underline that Spain pursuedthose goals wholeheartedly. His immediate intention was to halt any entanglementof the Spanish request with the EEC efforts to define association in the lightof the neutrality of Austria, Switzerland and Sweden. In their passion to defend thenew faith, officials reached the point of arguing that the Franco regime was willingto evolve politically in order to make Spain's future EEC membership feasible. 45This strategy tried to avoid any delay in the opening of negotiations andincreased the likelihood of using the consolation-prize strategy. When Francebrought the case of Spain to the Committee of Permanent Representatives, once thecrisis over the French veto on the British application was over and various applicationsrenewed, the Italian delegate called the French initiative a “major blunder”and his Dutch colleague drew attention to the fact that there were other applicationson the table on which the French refused to move. “If the Spanish wanted economicarrangements”, the Dutch representative concluded, “something might be done butassociation was a political act and any undertaking that this should ultimately leadto membership was in the present situation unthinkable.” The Germans, in whatwas then perceived as a pre-negotiated stand with the French, entered the discussionat the end to present exploratory talks with Madrid as the perfect course ofaction in between the two extreme positions. 46A few days later, the Spanish ambassador to the Communities delivered to Paul-Henri Spaak, then President of the EEC Council of Ministers, a letter clarifying thesense of the previous Spanish application. The new letter asked the Community“for exploratory talks with the aim of finding out the sort of relations that could beestablished between Spain and the EEC.” 47 The Spanish knew well that by notmentioning association they had a better chance of persuading the Community toopen talks with them on the whole subject of the repercussions of the CommonMarket policies on Spain with a view to defining how the Six could assist. In thisnew spirit, Spaak could announce that “it was clear that if Spain was encountering44. MAE, Leg. 6415, exp. 26: “Aspectos politico-institucionales del Mercado Común; incidencias delos mismos en una eventual aproximación de España a la C.E.E.” by the Director for InternationalOrganisations, 12 December 1961.45. MAE, Leg. 6658, exp. 5: “Nota sobre la conversación sostenida por el Sr. Ministro de Hacienda conel Subsecretario del Auswärtiges Amt, Sr. [Rolf] Lahr [Under-Secretary at the German Foreign Ministryand official in charge of EEC matter], attached to despatch 199, Ambassasor to Minister Castiella,Bonn, 21 February 1962; Leg. 6916, exp. 8: “Guión de argumentos que deben reflejarse enlos artículos y comentarios al ingreso de España en el Mercado Común”, Madrid, 1 March 1962, andLeg. 6658, exp. 9 “Pourquoi est-il souhaitable d´intégrer l´Espagne dans la Communauté européenne?”,attached to Ambassador to Minister Castiella, “Cuestión oral, sobre España, del señorBirkelbach, en la Asamblea Parlamentaria Europea”, Brussels, 15 March 1962.46. Account based on (and quotations from) PRO, FO 371/177361: UK Delegation to the EurpoeanCommunities to FO, Brussels, 27 January 1964.47. MAE, Leg. 9389, exp. 25: “Reiteración ante la CEE del contenido de la carta de 9 de febrero de 1962solicitando la apertura de conversaciones”, Madrid to Ambassador in Brussels, 13 February 1964.