Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

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80Mikael af MalmborgGermany might turn its political attention to the east and thus convulse the integrityof the Western World in general and of European unity in particular.That is how the Americans and the Europeanists perceived reality. Their Communitythinking was utterly incompatible with the balance thinking of the Nordicstates, and, therefore, in the heyday of the cold war Swedish officials and politicianswere incapable of convincing Paris, Bonn and Washington to accept associationon Swedish terms.What about the Finland argument in this context? To refer to concerns foranother state when justifying ones own policy is hardly convincing in a world ofsovereign states, and might cause problems for the future. The Finland argumentwas, therefore, employed with moderation in public, and in diplomatic contactsmainly at a later stage of deliberations or in overt crisis situations.Would it have been possible for Sweden to forget about Finland and the NordicBalance and seek security in NATO and market access by full EEC membership?The Americans seem to have thought so, and the Six, it seems, were simply tooanxious about their own stability to consider any nuances of the Nordic securitypattern. At least in some cases, the employment of the Finland argument seems tohave reinforced an already strong impression that neutrality was mainly a device tocatch a free ride.Even if this criticism was partly legitimate, there can be no doubt that therepeated concern for Finland was a serious element in the construction of Sweden’sforeign policy. The consolidation of Finland’s independence vis-à-vis the SovietUnion was perceived as an integral part of Sweden’s national interest. This concernwas mainly a matter of military security, but eventually also extended to marketformations.With some distance it becomes clear to what degree Nordic cooperation was aproject contingent on the Cold War. Nordism could certainly draw on much morefavourable cultural, linguistic and historical conditions than European integration.Culture, however, rarely is a sufficient explanation. Even though the EFTA experienceshowed that there were considerable gains to be made from increased intra-Nordic trade, economic considerations cannot fully explain the quest for a separateNordic market. What placed the Nordic project high on the political agenda was thebipolar structure of the postwar world.Mikael af Malmborg
Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.The Diplomacy of ‘dignified calm’ 81The Diplomacy of ‘Dignified Calm’An Analysis of Ireland's Application for Membership of the EEC1961 – 1963Dermot KeoghIntroductionThe closure of most of the official archives of the Irish state until the early 1990s,when a 30-year rule was first introduced, has resulted in the relative underdevelopmentof contemporary Irish history in comparison with the level of specialisationand publication in the majority of other countries in the European Union (EU). Thelarge number of national and comparative studies on the first unsuccessful attemptat enlargement in 1962 demonstrates the advanced state of scholarship in manycountries on that topic. 1 In contrast, the study of Irish history in the 1950s and1960s based on official archives – including the country's relationship with theEuropean Economic Community (EEC) – has only got under way in the mid-1990s. 2 This work has not caught up with research in comparable countries inEurope. 3This article, using the files of the Departments of the Taoiseach [Prime Minister]and External Affairs [renamed Foreign Affairs in the 1970s] and interviewswith Irish participants, will first examine the background to Ireland's shift in policyfrom protectionism towards free trade at the end of the 1950s. It will then trace theIrish policy and decision-making process from the time of application in mid-1961to de Gaulle's veto of British membership in January 1963. A small group of politiciansand senior civil servants were responsible for the drafting and management ofthe application for membership and for the subsequent round of discussions whicheventually resulted in a positive decision to allow Ireland to enter negotiations on1. As an example of this scholarship, see A. DEIGHTON (ed.), Building Postwar Europe – NationalDecision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-1963, London 1995; See also Proceedings of theconference “Acceleration, Deepening and Enlarging: the European Economic Community, 1957-1963,” organised by A. Deighton and A. Milward, St Antony's, Oxford, 21 -24 March 1996.2. But overall, however, research in this area is in the very early stages. The first study, based on therecords of the Department of Finance, was written by a former official and participant in the negotiationsof 1972. See D. J. MAHER, The Tortuous Path: The Course of Ireland's entry into the EEC1948-1973, Dublin 1986. Some background material of relevance may also be found in Ronan Fanning'sofficial history of the Department of Finance, The Irish Department of Finance 1922-1958,Dublin 1978. See also my general survey, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1989, Cork and Dublin 1990.3. Two young scholars have been working on doctoral topics in the general area. Both M. Fitzgerald,Department of History and Civilisation, European University Institute, and P. w. Bower, Departmentof History, University College Cork are working on doctoral theses in this general area.
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