Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Association or Trade Agreement? 109informed of this diplomatic success at the same time as of the sudden collapse ofthe Free Trade Area of the Seventeen. 17 The Maudling Committee would only meetto plan its discreet dissolution.The collapse of an OEEC-wide strategy led to the formation of the EuropeanFree Trade Association (EFTA) as an alternative grouping to counteract the powerof attraction exercised by the Six on some OEEC countries, while continuing toexercise a collective pressure on moderate EEC discrimination. Negotiationsamong the seven members of the Stockholm Group were looked upon with littleapprehension in Madrid. The various, intermittent statements during the processleading to the Stockholm Convention, which affirmed that EFTA would facilitatethe establishment of a multilateral association embracing western Europe, in factcalmed the Spanish authorities. They had other fish to fry.If the under-developed countries of the western bloc, Finland, Greece, Iceland,Ireland and Turkey, were caught in between the battle of Sixes and Sevens, Spainalso was in the midst of its particular battle for stabilisation. If Spain were to contemplateassociation with either of the trade groupings, it would have required considerablylonger to dismantle its trade barriers than the ten year period consideredby both the Treaty of Rome and the Stockholm Convention. Thus Spain's initialstrategy was to count on a revised OEEC in which intra-European disputes couldfind a solution taking into account the needs of the weakest economies, while in themean-time the Spanish economy was assimilating the stabilisation measures of thesummer of 1959 and the new tariff instrument applied since spring 1960. Preservingthe OEEC as the main institution for European economic cooperation was consideredthe best way to iron out differences between the Six and the Seven, to takeinto account the interest of countries that belonged to neither group, to give animpulse to liberalisation in agricultural trade and to obtain development aid. Aftermore than a decade of exclusion, the government of Spain became enthusiasticallypro-OEEC! 18The Spanish government wanted to stay on the sidelines for as long as theycould, hoping the remodelled OEEC would look after Spain's interests. Because oftrade, they were torn between the Six and the Seven and thus welcomed any kind ofreconciliation. For this reason Madrid was unhappy about the failure of theKennedy Administration to give a strong lead in the right direction. It feared thatthe tug-of-war between Sixes and Sevens would render the new Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ineffective. This would forceSpain “to choose fairly quickly between the Six and the Seven”. 1917. MAE, Leg. 4646, exp. 22: Note for the Cabinet, “Zona de Libre Comercio”, 14 November 1958.18. For an account of Spain´s expectations of the OEEC by the time of its accession, MAE, Leg. 5459,exp. 10: President of the Spanish Delegation to the OEEC to Minister Castiella, “Cooperación deEspaña con la OECE”, Paris, 27 July 1959. For the Spanish views on the re-organisation of theOEEC, PRO, FO 371/150086: “Memorandum” by the Spanish Delegation, Paris, 12 March 1960.19. The Director for Economic Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador,PRO, FO 371/150327: British Ambassador to FO, Madrid, 23 December 1960.