Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

20Wolfram Kaiserreduction of tariffs on industrial goods in the hope that the creation of EFTA wouldfacilitate a settlement with the EEC. However, EFTA's internal economic equilibriumbecame a recurring issue with the advent of the debate about possible accelerationof the timetable for the gradual reduction and eventual abolition of all internaltariffs. Even before the Stockholm Convention was initialled, the Wigny Report,named after the Belgian foreign minister, had initiated a debate on accelerationwithin the EEC, including the early introduction of the common external tariff.Although the interests of the Six diverged considerably over this issue, the EECCouncil of Ministers decided in favour of acceleration in principle in March 1960.The eventual compromise solution agreed upon on 1 July 1960 provided for thenext internal tariff reduction of 10 per cent to be brought forward by twelve monthsto 1 January 1961. In addition, subject to a multilateral solution being found inGATT later, the EEC lowered its common external tariff by 20 per cent and beganwith its introduction immediately. It was left to the member states to delay this stepuntil 1 January 1961. Meanwhile, the German government received permission notto reverse its previous unilateral tariff cuts of up to 25 per cent of 1957 by morethan 50 per cent.The EEC's acceleration decision put EFTA under pressure to revise its timetableaccordingly. EFTA's first tariff reduction of 20 per cent, designed to catch up withthe EEC, was scheduled for 1 July 1960. To demonstrate EFTA's ability to act efficiently,the British government now demanded that the next tariff reduction – 10per cent scheduled for 1 January 1962 – should also be moved forward by twelvemonths. The British position was supported by the Swedes and the Swiss. However,the acceleration of tariff reductions could only undermine the arrangementsthat had led to EFTA's foundation in 1959. At a meeting of senior officials fromEFTA states in July 1960 the Norwegians insisted that their government could notaccept acceleration under any circumstances because of its potentially disastrouseffects on Norwegian industry. 56 At the decisive EFTA Ministerial Council meetingin October 1960 the Norwegian delegation modified its position and argued that asignificant increase in British import quotas for Norwegian fish was the absoluteprecondition for their support for acceleration. 57 The Danes also demanded furtherBritish concessions over agriculture. In addition, they refused to move on thedomestically controversial acceleration issue before the Folketing election inNovember. The British government eventually succeeded in moving the next 10 percent tariff reduction forward by six months to 1 July 1961. 58 Nonetheless, the Britishviewed EFTA's failure to keep in step with the EEC as a major diplomaticdefeat.When the wider trade settlement which the EFTA states had set out to achievein 1959 failed to materialize in 1960-1, it also became obvious that they were unableto agree on an alternative policy. At this stage Britain was no longer contentwith safeguarding its core trade interests. Instead, the British became primarily56. PRO CAB 134/1825 (12 July 1960).57. PRO CAB 134/1826 (10-12 October 1960).58. PRO CAB 134/1829 (23 February 1961).