Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Association or Trade Agreement? 111British volte-face concerning the EEC, the Spanish authorities decided to informLondon at once of their decision. 26 The idea was to open immediate negotiations toreach an association agreement as soon as possible to benefit from the new bridgebuildingstrategy by which EFTA members would negotiate collectively their entryconditions into the EEC. This became urgent after Alfred Müller-Armack, the FederalRepublic Under-Secretary of Economics and close adviser to Minister LudwigErhard, announced in plain language that the EEC did not consider the possibilityof any association with Spain. 27Spain's EFTA policy was aborted by London. The British cabinet was not disposedto welcome the Spanish proposal at the time the United Kingdom was aboutto apply for membership of the EEC and did not want to complicate the issue byincreasing the number of EFTA countries that would have to be accommodated.Madrid insisted; if the United Kingdom and others moved towards the Six, MinisterCastiella asked “Should (we) attempt to negotiate through the Seven or independently?”The Secretary of State replied that in their efforts to solve the problemsof a wider union the British government would work out arrangements toassociate peripherals. 28 In other words, Madrid should wait until bridge-buildingengineers had successfully finished their job. In this sense, the Spanish made noserious move until they concluded that the bridge was not going to be built at alland that they and their oranges were left out in the cold.IIIThe formulation of a bilateral approach to the EEC, which the Spanish were forcedto prepare following the British application of August 1961, had been delayed bythe lack of effective discrimination against Spanish staples in their primary exportmarkets. An immediate, explicit and direct response became imperative, not necessarilybecause of the collapse of the collective approach but because the breakdowncoincided with the perception of having finally to face effective discrimination.The threat of increased discrimination in the important markets of the Six hadconstituted a permanent component of Spain's policy towards the EEC. At first, thiswas a specific concern linked to the sudden deterioration of the balance of paymentsin 1954-56 which drained the (always scarce) gold and foreign exchangereserves. Fortunately for Spain, however, no major discrimination was raisedagainst its exports until December 1961. Up to then, the tariff reductions and quota26. PRO, FO 371/158217: “Record of Conversation [with Minister Ullastres]” by Sir Hugh Ellis-Reeswho was acting as head of a World Bank mission, Madrid, 8 April 1961.27. MAE, Leg. 10383, exp. 4: “Informe para el Señor Ministro: España ante la división de Europa endos grupos económicos rivales”, by the Directors of Economic Cooperation Organisations and ofEconomic Relations, 10 May 1961.28. PRO, CAB 133/298: “Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the SpanishMinister for Foreign Affairs in Madrid at 11 a.m. on May 29, 1961”.