Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument 79ious to tie Denmark and Norway to a Nordic agreement before the EEC negotiationsstarted. Through such an arrangement he hoped to make Sweden a memberof, or at least closely associated with, the EEC. 50De Gaulle’s withdrawal gave Finland cold feet. The road would now be open forDanish and Norwegian membership. The situation was aggravated when the Six atthe Hague summit, on 1-2 December, agreed on new plans for closer integration,and also gave the green light for negotiations with the UK. Denmark and Norwaywould now clearly reorient themselves towards Europe. Nordek thus threatened tobecome a link to the EEC in a way that was unacceptable with regard to Finland’srelations with the Soviet Union.In March 1970 the Finnish Government declared that they had decided not tosign the Nordek Treaty. In this situation both Baunsgaard and Krag tried to launchthe idea of a Common Market of the three Scandinavian countries, a Skandek, withoutFinland. That idea was, however, rejected by Prime Minister Palme, apparentlypartly due to concern for Finland. Things would have been quite different had Finlandsaid right from the very beginning that it could not participate, as many hadexpected. In a discussion with a leading Danish official, Jens Christensen, sometime after the failure of Nordek, Palme regretted his hasty ’no’ to Skandek, butreferred to Sweden’s “sentimental” relation with Finland. 51ConclusionWhy was membership of the EEC regarded as unthinkable for Sweden? When theSwedish Government decided not to apply for full membership in 1961, securitypolicy considerations were apparently most prominent. In Swedish eyes specialtreatment, in the form of a comprehensive association agreement, was a righteousdemand because it served a higher purpose; it was regarded as a common good notto endanger the established order of peace and stability in Northern Europe. TheNordic order was based on respect for the fact that each country had its own separatepolicy, but nevertheless formed an ensemble that could facilitate a relativedétente with the Soviet Union. For Sweden, full EEC membership could endangerthe policy of neutrality and tilt the Nordic balance.Why, then, were the EEC and the USA so reluctant to accept association onSwedish terms? How could association of some small neutral countries be conceivedas so dangerous? The American cold war policy was to be hard on the hard,and this policy conspired to the irreversible musketeer’s philosophy of Europeanfederalists. They honoured the principle ‘one for all, all for one’. An equivalent tothe Nordic balance at a European level opened up a nightmare scenario in which50. J. CHRISTENSEN, “Danmark, Norden og EF 1963-72”, in B. N. THOMSEN (ed.), The Odd ManOut? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948-1992, Odense 1993, p. 142.51. J. CHRISTENSEN, “Danmark, Norden og EF”, pp. 143-144.