Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

More documents

Recommendations

Info

58Markus SchulteFigure 3.7: Imports of paper and paper products from the EFTA compared to the 1953-58 trend160000140000t 53-58EFTADM 100012000010000080000600004000020000053-153-354-154-355-155-356-156-357-157-358-158-359-159-360-160-361-161-362-162-363-163-364-164-3quartersConclusionsThe conclusions to the quantitative evidence assembled here can be stated verybriefly. The essence is that for the potential winners from the free trade area orfrom British accession, the opportunity costs of not having achieved these arrangementswere hardly visible in terms of foreign trade. This was due in part to theoverall strong growth of demand in Western Europe but as well to the fact that thestrong position of these export-oriented sectors of German industry in the EFTAmarkets could not easily be challenged in terms of the volume of supply by the producersamong the Seven. Thus for these industries only the UK was a serious competitorable to displace some of their exports in the EFTA markets. Yet given thecontinuing growth of demand in these markets this relative deterioration there didnot show in the trade statistics as a fall relative to the pre-EFTA trend of exports. Infact, exports to EFTA as a whole did not fall anywhere substantially below thattrend. This is not only the case for the potential winners from the free trade area butalso for most of the potential losers.It would obviously be possible to calculate the opportunity cost for each individualsector concerning exports to the EFTA markets by applying the respectivesectoral trend of export growth to the EEC and to EFTA and calculate the differencebetween these estimated values and the actual export figures. Yet given thatthis study is not so much concerned with the trade diversion caused by the EEC andEFTA but rather with industrial interest and potential pressure group action in relationto negotiations on preferential trading areas, it is sufficient here to look at the
Industrial Interest in West Germany´s Decision 59visibility of these opportunity costs at that time. Apart from the fact that this studyis not mainly concerned with the question of trade creation and diversion, one hasto bear in mind that the very visible increase in exports to the EEC was not onlydue to the same growth in demand that was at work, with difference in degree, in allof Western Europe, but as far as France and Italy are concerned also to their highlevels of protection prior to the foundation of the EEC.Thus the highest rates of growth in German exports were to these two previouslyhighly protected markets, while the growth of exports to the smaller Europeaneconomies within or outside the EEC was, where it occurred, more moderatethan that. Hence, if one were to calculate the opportunity cost of individual sectorsor manufacturing exports as a whole, one would have to figure into the equation thedifferent levels of protection before and after the coming into effect of the EEC ineach individual EFTA market. It is hard to make a clear statement on the basis ofthe presented graphs as to what the opportunity cost was. Yet in view of these considerations,it is safe to assume that, had there been the free trade area, exports fromthe sectors of German industry which were potential gainers to the EFTA countrieswould most probably not have grown at a rate comparable to the average rate ofgrowth to the individual EEC countries and certainly not nearly as fast as exports toFrance and Italy grew in most industrial sectors analysed here.The export evidence for some of those sectors which saw themselves as thepotential losers from any enlargement of the EEC or any wider free trade area comprisingthe Seven or some of them, leads to conclusions which are very differentfrom those drawn in the case of the potentially winning sectors. This is mainly dueto the expectations in these sectors with which the trade figures were seen. Duringthe Maudling negotiations the assumption in these sectors was that the foundationof any free trade area would result in major damage or even catastrophe for therespective industry. The prime concern was serious competition in the home marketeither from Scandinavia and Austria (paper, non-ferrous metals) or from the UnitedKingdom (non-ferrous metal products). The trends for exports of these sectors toEFTA up to 1958 anyway were either only very moderately rising or indeed steeplyfalling, as in non-ferrous metals. If the free trade area came into existence, hugelosses in exports were taken for granted. Nothing could be done about that, giventhat German exports in some of these sectors already were losing out against theircompetitors among the Seven in the absence of the free trade area. Thus initially,the prime concern of the potential losers was the protection of the home market.Yet once the EEC had come into operation with the CET guaranteeing moreprofitable prices for the problem sectors, the concern with regard to the free tradearea was not only the danger of foreign competition in the domestic but also in thecommon market that was to evolve. Once the industries had become aware of thepotential for exports to France and Italy, they were fighting not only against potentiallosses on the home market but at the same time for profits they were sure toincur on the EEC markets.Thus for the potential losers from the free trade area and from British accession,both their likely losses and their opportunity costs were very visible indeed. This isparticularly clear in the case of the paper industry.
Page 6:
4Introductory note - Introduction -
Page 9 and 10: Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
Page 11 and 12: Challenge to the Community 91961. T
Page 13 and 14: Challenge to the Community 11cellor
Page 15 and 16: Challenge to the Community 13widesp
Page 17 and 18: Challenge to the Community 15about
Page 19 and 20: Challenge to the Community 17undoub
Page 21 and 22: Challenge to the Community 19period
Page 23 and 24: Challenge to the Community 21concer
Page 25 and 26: Challenge to the Community 23partia
Page 27 and 28: Challenge to the Community 25of-pay
Page 29 and 30: Challenge to the Community 27ment b
Page 31 and 32: Challenge to the Community 29With r
Page 33 and 34: Challenge to the Community 31The Au
Page 35 and 36: Challenge to the Community 33nauer
Page 39 and 40: Industrial Interest in West Germany
Page 59: Industrial Interest in West Germany
Page 67 and 68: Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Arg
Page 85 and 86: The Diplomacy of ‘dignified calm
Page 107 and 108: Association or Trade Agreement? 105
Page 109 and 110: Association or Trade Agreement? 107
Page 111 and 112:
Association or Trade Agreement? 109
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
Page 125 and 126:
Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buc
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Notices - Informations - Mitteilung
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfas
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Annual subscription: 75 - DM /1500-
show all

Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?