112Fernando Guiraosystem for which the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome provi<strong>de</strong>d within the EEC area were exten<strong>de</strong>dto Spain on the basis <strong>of</strong> the most-favoured-nation clause contained in its bilateralagreements with EEC member-States.Tra<strong>de</strong> in oranges serves to show the impact <strong>of</strong> the EEC on Spain's foreign tra<strong>de</strong>(Table 2). Oranges constituted Spain's largest earner <strong>of</strong> foreign exchange and thecategory in which tra<strong>de</strong> with the EEC reached the largest proportion, above sixtyeightper cent by value after 1956.TABLE 2: Spain´s orange exports to the EEC, 1956-62 (in tons)1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962TotalExportsExports tothe EEC378.804 458,562 731,913 784,435 941,108 906,204 1.120,932258,003 318,999 500,140 575,945 708,850 656,982 818,223FRG 124,365 181,987 236,189 299,211 377,199 357,136 450,876France 62,705 79,943 128,766 137,932 162,637 129,087 155,352Netherlands 42,092 26,373 79,066 79,648 89,709 93,967 116,174Belgium 28,841 30,696 56,119 59,154 79,305 76,791 95,821Exports tothe EEC as% <strong>of</strong> totalexports68 69 68 73 75 72 72In the table as in the text, orange exports inclu<strong>de</strong> all varieties <strong>of</strong> oranges and mandarins.Exports to EEC markets increased at a higher rate than exports to world markets,except in 1958 and 1960. The exception for 1958 should be counterbalancedby the important overall increase that took place (fifty-seven per cent) and that for1961 by the general <strong>de</strong>cline in the export volumes <strong>of</strong> this commodity. Any possibleswing in Spain's exports to the Six during these years should not be attributed toany specific discrimination linked to the EEC Treaty but to a combination <strong>of</strong> naturalfluctuations in crops and to the discouraging effect <strong>of</strong> the lack <strong>of</strong> convertibility<strong>of</strong> the Spanish currency unit.Tra<strong>de</strong> concessions however were subject to the permanent threat <strong>of</strong> unilateralremoval. In view <strong>of</strong> the impossibility <strong>of</strong> obtaining from the EEC a long-term pledgein favour <strong>of</strong> Spain's export tra<strong>de</strong> stability, the Spanish authorities called in theassistance <strong>of</strong> the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tra<strong>de</strong> (GATT), an institution towhich Spain did not belong. The aim was to obtain a formal guarantee that Spanishexports would not suffer discrimination due to the implementation <strong>of</strong> the Treaty <strong>of</strong>
Association or Tra<strong>de</strong> Agreement? 113Rome. 29 The Minister <strong>of</strong> Commerce had no trouble in <strong>de</strong>claring that a specific policytowards the EEC was not urgent as long as means existed to <strong>of</strong>fset the discriminationestablished by the Treaty. 30 Unfortunately for the Spanish, GATT was <strong>of</strong> noassistance and effective discrimination could no longer be avoi<strong>de</strong>d after 1961 whenthe drive pressure towards common external tariff levels started. It was then, maybefor the very first time, that the Spanish authorities came to perceive the EEC ashaving a direct and immediate negative impact on Spanish export tra<strong>de</strong>. Althoughthis was not the case in the short term, the important aspect is that the Spanishauthorities believed it was so.Oranges could again serve to show the disturbing horizon created by the implementation<strong>of</strong> a common tariff wall by those countries that purchased seventy-twoper cent <strong>of</strong> Spain's exports <strong>of</strong> this commodity in 1961, although similar casesoccurred for other horticultural products such as wine and olive oil. Oranges fromoutsi<strong>de</strong> the EEC area were to be subject to twenty per cent ad valorem dutiesbetween 1 October and 14 March and fifteen per cent during the rest <strong>of</strong> the year.This situation meant an increase in the levels <strong>of</strong> tariff protection applying in Spain'smain export market for oranges and the like, i.e., six per cent throughout the year inthe Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic <strong>of</strong> Germany. 31 The common tariff would increase threefoldthe duty on half <strong>of</strong> Spain's orange exports to the Six. The only alleviation concernedFrance, where tariff duties were <strong>–</strong> according to the period <strong>of</strong> the year consi<strong>de</strong>red<strong>–</strong> between twenty and thirty-five per cent. Lower duties on exports toFrance, <strong>de</strong>spite the fact that it took one third <strong>of</strong> Spain's orange exports to the Six,could not be consi<strong>de</strong>red as compensation for the damage done in the German market.In addition, France <strong>of</strong>fered preferential access to the increasing orange production<strong>of</strong> North Africa to the <strong>de</strong>triment <strong>of</strong> Spain. A common external tariff impliedthat Spain had to renounce all exemptions previously reached through bilateral<strong>de</strong>alings and start bargaining new concessions with the EEC as a whole fromscratch. This was a dramatic prospect if consi<strong>de</strong>ration is given to the fact that citrusfruit exports to the Six plus those other markets in the process <strong>of</strong> either accession toor association with the EEC amounted, according to the year, to between twentyand twenty-five per cent <strong>of</strong> total foreign currency earned through exportation. 3229. At the time <strong>of</strong> the first tariff cuts following the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Rome, MAE, Leg. 5631, exp. 2: CommercialCounsellor to Minister Ullastres, “Estudio preliminar para un eventual acercamiento <strong>de</strong> Españaal Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT)”, Bern, 26 January 1959. Atthe time the Six <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to accelerate the customs union process. Leg. 9279, exp- 7: “Nota para elSeñor Subsecretario. Presencia <strong>de</strong> España en la XVI sesión <strong>de</strong>l GATT (Ginebra 16 <strong>de</strong> mayo <strong>de</strong>1960)” by the Director <strong>of</strong> Economic Cooperation Organisations, 7 April 1960. At the time <strong>of</strong> thetariff cuts <strong>of</strong> 1961, Leg. 10388, exp. 4: Minister Castiella to Consul in Geneva, 16 January.30. MAE, Leg. 6415, exp. 25: Note for the Un<strong>de</strong>r-Secretary <strong>of</strong> International Oraganisations at the Ministry<strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, “Declaraciones <strong>de</strong>l Ministro <strong>de</strong> Comercio sobre las negociaciones tarifariascon el GATT y el Mercado Común en la Asamblea <strong>de</strong> las Cámeras <strong>de</strong> Comercio, Industria y Navegación<strong>de</strong> España”, 7 November 1961.31. MAE, Leg. 6417, exp. 14: “Posible resultado negativo <strong>de</strong> las peticiones <strong>de</strong> los importadores <strong>de</strong> naranjas<strong>de</strong> la C.E.E.”, Spanish Mission to the EEC, Brussels, 12 December 1961.32. For relevant documentation on the various aspects mentioned so far in this section, MAE, Leg. 5911,exps. 1 and 2; Leg. 6417, exps. 12-14; and Leg. 6916, exp. 6.