Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

132Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungenattempted to pressure France into accepting convergent monetary and trade policies gaverise to French anxieties regarding the balance of power within the European communities.The book ends with a revealing chapter on Germany’s unification and its European implications.The author proves that France, as early as the second year of the Mitterand administration(1983), was prepared to go along with German unification provided the united Germanywas prepared to honour its security commitments to the West. He leaves no doubt that anincreasing amount of shared economic interests made it easier for France to pledge its supportfor eventual German unification. In a way France’s attitude thus was predeterminedwhen the GDR collapsed and Kohl promised to step up the pace of European integration andthe creation of a European monetary union in exchange for France’s support of German unification.With all its merits this book suffers somewhat from an overly compartmentalized structurewhich sometimes, especially in the earlier parts, tends to obscure the chronologicalsequence of events. But this does not detract from its value as a concise overview based onthe findings of most recent research (some the author’s own) and enriched by numerous referencesto German opinion polls.The German reader, in particular, will gain from using this book as a means to familiarizehimself/herself with the specifically French perspective of its topic, as he is made aware ofthe many pitfalls Germany’s foreign policy will have to avoid in order not to revive Frenchfears of “German uncertainties” and to maintain the high level of mutual understanding thathas so far been achieved between the two countries. The author mentions a number of suchtraps – e.g. creating the impression of a German-American or even a German-American-Russian “axis” to make decisions on Europe’s destinies at the expense of Germany’s immediateneighbours or using the new members of the European Union as vehicles of an overbearingGerman influence. The Germans’ failure to come to terms with their past in thiscentury, the author feels, is likely to strengthen a tendency in Germany to ignore such pitfalls.The German reader may be inclined to minimize such concerns and instead to emphasizethe very practical questions of economic growth and security as determinants of Germany’sfuture foreign policy. One of these more practical aspects, as the author rightly pointsout, will be the “ability of Germany’s partners to accept the new European realities, whichstrengthen its position, and to grant Germany the role that befits it in the Greater Europe tobe rebuilt”. One may object, and the author actually makes this point himself, that manyGermans are none too eager to envisage such increased European responsibilities for theircountry, which in their view would fare better as another Switzerland. One may also arguethat, as a rule, European issues do not make headlines in today’s Germany and that a massivepopular backing for an enhanced German role in the European Union still has to be produced.At any event, this book has contributed to create a European environment conduciveto encourage the new Germany to play its role as a European partner and, maybe, as a pioneer.Klaus SchwabeThe Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo