Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'

66Mikael af Malmborgwas to what extent Sweden should make public statements on how to act in a hypotheticalcase of Soviet attacks on Finland. This issue split the government, whichrefused any such public statements on hypothetical situations, and the opposition,which advocated open declarations. The government was on the horns of adilemma. On the one hand they did not want to speculate about hypothetical situationsand bind their policy to developments in Finland. On the other hand they wereanxious to speak in support of Finland’s independence. The Finland argument wasrarely mentioned in public and, therefore, does not appear frequently in publicprinted sources.The Finland argument was rarely as overtly referred to as in 1952 by the SocialDemocratic delegate Rolf Edberg when speaking to the Council of Europe. Whenthe UK Government in 1952 responded to the projected European Defence Communityby launching the Eden Plan for the integration of military tasks in thesphere of authority of the Council of Europe, Sweden had to reconsider her futuremembership of the organisation. In this crisis situation, when Sweden did not evenhave Britain’s ear, Edberg referred to the Finland argument. The firm Swedish attitudeon this issue, he said, was due to...“obvious concerns for another Nordic country, with which Sweden had been unitedin one realm for six hundred years, a fact which led us to follow a separate politicalline. It is our conviction that within the limits of this foreign policy, we pay our tributeto the security and stability of Europe.” 6On the other hand, archive materials reveal a rather frequent use of the Finlandargument in diplomatic contacts with the USA and the UK, in order to convincethese two countries to accept the Swedish policy of neutrality. On at least two occasions,the Finno-Soviet crises of 1958 and 1961, the USA invited Sweden to takethe consequences of her own argumentation and give Finland more open economicand diplomatic support. Once the differences of the Cold War had settled, economicrelations seem to have become a rather important part of the Finland problem.7The Soviet Union had been suspicious for some time that Swedish neutralityonly was a “wait and see” policy, and in the first NATO years Soviet diplomacytowards Sweden can be interpreted as an attempt to have the Swedes steadily confirmand reconfirm their line. The most the Soviets could get from Sweden was astrict application of neutrality, and the concession the Soviets paid for this wasgood behaviour towards Stockholm and Helsinki. As a rule this was the case afterStalin. 8On the Western side the struggle for the recognition of Swedish neutrality was amore open ended process, and as a matter of fact politically more troublesome. TheUSA certainly demanded everything else but a strict application of neutrality and6. Swedish Foreign Office (SFO), HP 49 A, vol. 1871, PM from Per Lind, Stockholm, June 6, 1952,and Europarådet 1952, pp. 31-33. (Translated by the author)7. The Finland problematique in the Swedish security policy, 1948-1962, is presently the subject of aPhD project by Olof Kronvall at the Swedish War College, Stockholm.8. A.O. BRUNDTLAND, “The Nordic Balance”, p. 34.