1968_4_arabisraelwar
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International Politics<br />
United States and United Nations<br />
ARMS RACE • U.S. COMMITMENT • UNEF WITHDRAWAL • EGYPTIAN<br />
BLOCKADE • SOVIET-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY • REACTIONS TO SIX-DAY<br />
WAR • UN DEBATES • SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION • JERUSALEM<br />
AND REFUGEES<br />
X HE SIX-DAY WAR brought relations between the United States and<br />
Israel into the spotlight of world attention. The American role in the Middle<br />
East crisis has been given quite contradictory interpretations. Soviet officials<br />
charged that Washington encouraged Israeli "aggression." President Gamal<br />
Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic fabricated a tale of collusion and<br />
direct intervention by United States air and naval forces on Israel's side during<br />
the fighting. On the other hand, some supporters of Israel contended that<br />
the United States could have averted the war if it had firmly and effectively<br />
demonstrated its commitment to the threatened Jewish state. They argued<br />
that Washington's hesitation, its unwillingness to act alone, and its preoccupation<br />
with Vietnam emboldened Nasser to think he could act with impunity<br />
and forced Israel into a war to defend its vital interests and its very existence.<br />
In point of fact, the United States was neither active belligerent nor passive<br />
observer. While unsuccessful in preventing the war, the United States<br />
acted in consultation with the Soviet Union, including the first dramatic exchange<br />
of messages on the Moscow-Washington "hot-line," to prevent a direct<br />
military involvement of the superpowers. After the war, the United<br />
States firmly and successfully opposed Soviet and Arab attempts at the United<br />
Nations to condemn Israel as an aggressor and to put pressure on Israel to<br />
give up the fruits of victory before the conclusion of a durable peace settlement.<br />
Despite disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem on some specific<br />
issues or tactics, full accord still existed at year's end on the fundamental<br />
principle that Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist as a free and secure<br />
state was a prerequisite to peace. There was also agreement that Arab-Israel<br />
peace depended on reaching a just and equitable settlement of all outstand-<br />
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