1968_4_arabisraelwar

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 171
the war broke out. President de Gaulle insisted that any action required
agreement among the Big Four, and when Russia rejected his suggestion for
a summit conference, he kept France on the sidelines.
At the same time, tentative plans were being considered in Washington,
in consultation with London and other maritime powers, for creating an
international flotilla, informally named Red Sea Regatta by its planners, to
sweep away mines and provide a naval escort for vessels through the blockaded
Strait to Eilat. Among the test cases considered by the Pentagon were
a tanker, flying a neutral flag but carrying oil, which Egypt regarded as a
strategic cargo, and an unarmed merchant ship, flying the Israeli flag, and
exercising the right of innocent passage. Most military specialists thought
that the U.S. seaplane tender and two destroyers in the Red Sea, together
with some British vessels would be an adequate escort. Thought was also
given to sending in the aircraft carrier Intrepid, which had just passed
through the Suez Canal on its way to the Far East. The military assumption
was that the Egyptians would not fire on this powerful armada, and, if they
did, the flotilla would make the necessary "limited and controlled response,"
i.e., putting the Egyptian shore batteries at Sharm el Sheikh out of commission.
While a military challenge of the Egyptian blockade seemed a rather
simple matter, there were grave fears in Washington and other capitals about
the possible political consequences. An Egyptian clash with American or
British forces might force the Russians to live up to their pledge to intervene.
Defense Department officials testified that any serious or lengthy U.S.
involvement in the Middle East would require the calling up of reserves.
Washington was also concerned over the effect on its relations with the Arab
states. Al Ahram stated that Egypt would regard any attempt to break the
blockade as "aggression," and would retaliate by denying passage through
the Suez Canal to the ships of any country that did so. State Department
officials felt that pro-American Jordan and Saudi Arabia would be placed
in an "impossible" position in the Arab world. Even the Washington Post,
normally sympathetic to Israel, qualified its editorial calling for the U.S.
to support Israel's free access to Eilat with the following caution:
But nothing could serve our interests worse than a jingoist, unilateral effort
to do so by waving the American flag. This would invite the cutting of pipelines
and destruction or nationalization of U.S. and other Western oil interests.
The governments of the other maritime nations had similar fears and
hesitations. Premier Eshkol later said that Eban had been assured that some
forty or fifty states would sign the maritime declaration. Yet only a handful
in principle agreed to do so. At the beginning of June diplomatic efforts appeared
deadlocked, and the Red Sea Regatta was becoming a far more exclusive
yacht club than its sponsors intended. Besides Britain and the U.S.,
only Australia and the Netherlands were willing to consider some kind of
action to test the blockade.