1968_4_arabisraelwar

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 159
greater support to Syria, with which he signed a defense pact in November
1966, at Moscow's urging? Whatever the truth, the Russians acted as if they
believed the charge. Thus, Soviet Premier Kosygin at the UN on June 19:
In those days, the Soviet Government, and I believe others too, began receiving
information to the effect that the Israeli Government had timed for the end of
May a swift stroke at Syria in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over
into the territory of the United Arab Republic.
President Nasser in his "resignation" address, June 9, noted that "our
friends in the Soviet Union told the [Egyptian] parliamentary delegation
which was visiting Moscow early last month that there was a calculated intention"
by Israel to invade Syria, confirming Egypt's "own reliable information."
Both Kosygin and Nasser failed to mention that Soviet Ambassador
Dimitri Chuvakhin in Tel Aviv refused three invitations (on May 12, 19 and
29) by top Israeli officials personally to inspect the area along the Syrian
frontier. The "nyet" to the Israeli offer on May 12 was either an act of gross
incompetence or, more likely, an ominous sign of Soviet intention to involve
the Egyptians more actively in backing Syria. Nasser claimed it was information
he received on May 13 of Israel's concentration of "huge armed forces"
near the Syrian border that led him to begin sending Egyptian troops into
Sinai on the night of May 14.
On May 15 Thant relayed to Cairo a message from the Israel government
assuring him that it had no intention of initiating military action (p. 117).
However, the Sinai buildup continued and began to assume massive proportions,
even after Thant reported to the Security Council on May 19 that,
along the Israeli-Syrian frontier, "UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence
of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides
of the line." Charles W. Yost, veteran United States diplomat in the Middle
East and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in Foreign
Affairs (January 1968) that "United States representatives in Israel at the
time also saw no evidence of the alleged troop concentrations."
Deterioration in United States-Egyptian
Relations
There were some, notably David G. Nes, United States charge d'affaires
in Cairo at the time, who argued that Washington could have averted the
1967 crisis if it had continued the economic aid to Egypt which ended in
mid-1966. Nes, who has since resigned from the Foreign Service, also contended
that the United States could not take effective action because it had
no ambassador in Cairo, who could have met with Nasser during the critical
period from March to May 21. Others ascribed the deterioration in relations
to Nasser's insistence on following policies diametrically opposed to vital
United States interests in the area. The administration found it difficult to
justify resumption of aid to Egypt in the face of strong congressional displeasure
over Nasser's continued call for the overthrow of the pro-Western