1968_4_arabisraelwar

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 153
ings were to discuss cultivation arrangements in the contested demilitarized
zones; they were broken off without progress after several sessions of procedural
wrangling (p. 116).
On February 5 the Arab "campaign of terror" against Israel was called
"morally reprehensible, politically irresponsible and a primary cause for the
recently increased tensions on Israel's borders" by Rodger P. Davies, the
deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.
Although Washington understood Israel's desire "to protect its citizens against
murderous assault," he added, the United States would continue to oppose
military retaliation. Davies said that the United States was determined to
maintain good relations with all states in the region, to use its "power and
influence" to prevent or contain conflict, and to "reinforce trends toward
reconciliation." He emphasized that this policy of "even-handedness" did not
mean the "abandonment of principle, and a moral judgement must enter
into decision-making on a case-by-case basis." The United States, he said,
took "a forthright position against aggression by either side."
Criticism of American Policy and State Department Response
The practical results of this policy of even-handedness aroused considerable
criticism in Congress. In January Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.),
described the American effort to conciliate all states of the region as a dangerous
"juggling act—an act of balancing that cannot withstand the tests of
time and tension." He described as unrealistic expectations that the United
Nations would effectively deal with the Arab-Israel dispute in light of the
Soviet Union's consistently pro-Arab bias and American policy of evenhandedness.
This situation served rather to encourage provocations by the Syrians and
other extremist elements, who were likely to feel secure in the knowledge
that the Soviet Union would paralyze any action by the Security Council
against them. At the same time, Javits continued, they might conclude that
United States readiness to condemn Israeli retaliation and the possibility of
UN sanctions in the event of another massive Israeli counterattack, would
restrain Israel from future retaliation. This situation, he felt, made it imperative
for the United States to adopt a more active Middle East policy, one
that would "sort out our friends and our foes, and concentrate our aid on
those who are our friends."
In an exchange of letters with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the New York
Republican elaborated on the theme that the firmness of the commitment of
the United States and its Western allies to preserve peace in the Middle East
had been placed in doubt by recent events, among them the rapid decline of
British power in the area and the determination of Gaullist France to play
a lone hand in international relations. Javits said that "the best vehicle for
stability and Western cooperation in the Middle East" had been the Tripartite
Declaration of May 1950 in which Britain and France had joined with