1968_4_arabisraelwar

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 155
against another, the President emphasized: "We intend to live up to that
commitment.")
Credibility of the United States Commitment
Secretary Rusk concluded that "I do not think that any Near Eastern government
is in doubt as to the seriousness of these assurances or the fact that
we are prepared to back them up with appropriate action should the need
arise."
However, doubts about this commitment were the crux of the problem in
the 1967 crisis. The admittedly overwhelming power of the United States
could be an effective deterrent to violent change in the area only if its willingness
to use this power was convincing. In 1967 the United States suffered
from a credibility gap.
The United States had last intervened directly in the area in the summer
of 1958, when President Eisenhower sent units of the Sixth Fleet to Lebanon
at the urgent request of its government to resist an armed revolt, supported
by Cairo, Damascus, and Moscow, whose avowed purpose, he said, was
"to subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United
Arab Republic." Eisenhower justified intervention as based on the March
1957 joint resolution of Congress that "the United States regards as vital to
the national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence
and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." The mere presence of the
American troops, a total of some 14,000 soldiers and marines, which were
not involved in combat and were soon withdrawn, acted as a stabilizing factor,
leading to a peaceful compromise and the survival of an independent
Lebanon. All the Arab League members, including the UAR, solemnly
pledged at a special UN session not to interfere in each others internal affairs.
The memory of the Lebanese incident is generally credited with deterring
potential mischiefmakers for several years. But there had been no similar
direct American response in any subsequent crisis, such as the massive Egyptian
intervention in the Yemen civil war, which erupted in 1962, and which
Saudi Arabia saw as a threat to itself.
In early April 1967 Premier Eshkol was asked by a U. S. News & World
Report interviewer whether he expected help from the United States, and
possibly Britain and France, if Israel were attacked in force by its Arab
neighbors. Eshkol replied that he would "surely expect such help," especially
in view of "all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel." He noted
that when Israel asked the United States for arms, Washington officials cited
these pledges and told the Israelis, "Don't spend your money. We are here.
The Sixth Fleet is here." Eshkol's reply to this advice was that "the Sixth
Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel
must be strong on its own." For this reason, he said, Israel was spending such
a relatively high amount for arms. He added that, in any conflict, Israel
would "rely primarily on our own Army. I wouldn't want American mothers