1968_4_arabisraelwar

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 179
forces to their positions before June 5, adding a vague request that, after
withdrawal was completed, the Security Council consider all aspects of the
situation and seek a peaceful solution of outstanding legal, political, and humanitarian
problems.
The United States backed a draft, sponsored by 20 Latin American countries,
that explicitly coupled the call for withdrawal with one asking the
parties to the conflict to end the state of belligerency. It noted that, under the
UN Charter, there should be neither acquisition of territory by force nor
threats against the integrity or independence of existing states. In calling for
an end to belligerency, the Latin American resolution in effect rejected the
legal basis for the Arab maritime blockade and economic boycott against
Israel. It asked the Security Council, "relying on the presence of the United
Nations," to insure withdrawal and the end of belligerency, and to achieve
freedom of transit in international waterways and solution of the refugee
problem. The resolution also reaffirmed the desirability of internationalizing
Jerusalem.
Neither resolution received the necessary two-thirds vote. The Yugoslav
and non-aligned draft obtained 53 votes in favor and 46 against, with 20
abstentions. The supporters included the 13 Arab states, 10 predominantly
Moslem nations in Asia and Africa, 11 Communist countries, 9 African
and 5 Asian non-Moslem states, and France, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and
Turkey. The Latin American draft obtained 57 votes in favor and 43 against,
with 20 abstentions. Supporters included the United States and all other
Western Hemisphere nations, except Cuba, 12 countries from Western Europe
and the British Commonwealth, 17 non-Arab African states, and 4
Asian states. Israel abstained.
American-Soviet Compromise Attempt
The obvious deadlock in the Assembly prompted the Soviet Union, in mid-
July, to enter into private consultations with the United States for the
purpose of finding some mutually acceptable formula that would justify Moscow's
dramatic call for the special UN session. In discussions with Soviet
Ambassador to Washington Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador Goldberg
suggested that Premier Kosygin's June 19 statement, recognizing the right of
every people to an independent national state, might be the starting point
for a suitable resolution. After further discussion, in which Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko joined, Soviet-American agreement was reached on a resolution
coupling a call for withdrawal of forces to the positions of June 5
with recognition by all states that every state in the Middle East has the right
"to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace
and security," free from the threat of acts or claims of war.
The Russians quickly discovered that they not only misjudged their chances
of pushing through a condemnation of Israel in the General Assembly, but
also miscalculated their influence with the Arab states, which refused to ac-