1968_4_arabisraelwar

166 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1968
This was to prove wishful thinking.
In order to head off the impending explosion, the United States tried to
convince the United Arab Republic to revoke, suspend, or at least to limit
implementation of its proclaimed blockade, and, at the same time, to restrain
both Israel and Egypt from resorting to armed force. An even greater concern
was to prevent the crisis from turning into a direct confrontation between
the two nuclear superpowers. In its efforts, Washington employed a
combination of normal bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral approaches,
ranging from the regular United Nations machinery to proposals
for a declaration by the major maritime powers, backed up by a multinational
flotilla, to challenge the blockade, if necessary.
According to one report, President Johnson sent Premier Kosygin a personal
message the day after the UNEF withdrawal, asking him to join with
the United States in convincing both the Arabs and the Israelis to exercise
restraint. Ambassador Goldberg also was instructed to impress on Soviet
delegate Federenko that the United States was anxious to avoid a frontal clash
with the Soviet Union. While the Russian reply handed Ambassador Llewellyn
Thompson in Moscow was considered "reasonably encouraging" with
regard to a direct confrontation, Moscow was not prepared to lend its support
to a common solution of the crisis.
UN Security Council Session
Moscow's reservations quickly became apparent at the first session of the
Security Council on May 24, called by Denmark and Canada. Federenko,
who previously loudly proclaimed the danger of an imminent crisis created
by Israeli and imperialist threats against Syria, completely changed his tune.
He questioned the need for "so hastily" convening the Council, and charged
that the Western powers "artificially fostered" a "dramatic climate" to justify
intervention in the region. Ambassador Goldberg replied that the Council
would be burying its head in the sand if it failed to consider a crisis on which
world attention focused. He backed the Danish and Canadian suggestion that
the Council formally endorse U Thant's peace efforts in Cairo, and announced
United States willingness to join with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and France, within and outside the United Nations, in restoring and maintaining
peace in the Middle East. Federenko replied that Washington and
London could prove their genuine interest in relaxing tensions by withdrawing
their fleets from the Mediterranean, as a first step.
Ambassador Awad el Kony of the UAR told the Council that Canada
and Denmark were trying to sabotage the Secretary General's mission. The
representatives of India, Bulgaria, and Mali joined the Soviet Union in refusing
to participate in consultations. The French delegate noted that the
Council could not act until the great powers reached agreement. The Council
adjourned without action.
On May 27 Thant reported to the Council on his discussions in Cairo.