1968_4_arabisraelwar

164 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1968
of Israel's population," and insisted on a written guarantee that the French
air force would protect Israel before taking action. Nasser emphasized that
today Israel did not have the same kind of backing. He indicated that, although
the United States "supports it and supplies it with arms," this was
only "a political alliance."
Revelations at the Cairo post-war trials indicated that Nasser erred in
greatly overestimating the strength of the Egyptian forces. At the same time,
he accurately assessed the extent and limits of the American commitment to
Israel. Before calling for the withdrawal of UNEF and again before announcing
the blockade, Nasser reportedly conferred with his top military advisors,
who assured him that the Egyptian forces were prepared if these acts should
provoke an Israeli attack. At one point Air Force Chief Lieutenant General
Mohammed Sidki Mahmoud apparently suggested to Nasser that Egypt strike
first, with well planned raids on Israel. Nasser was said to have objected to
this course on the ground that such an attack would lead to intervention by
the United States Sixth Fleet. In reply to Nasser's question about what would
happen if Israel were allowed to strike first, Sidki reportedly said that "only
about 20 per cent of Egypt's air power would be lost" and that the remaining
Egyptian bomber and fighter force could make a successful counterattack.
After the war, the Israelis disclosed a captured "secret operation
order" to the Egyptian air force "to be prepared for a sudden attack on Israel,"
listing targets but leaving the time open "in conformity with conditions
as they develop."
Nasser thus correctly assumed that the United States would be likely to
intervene militarily only if Israel were clearly the victim of attack.
Soviet Position
How much support Nasser expected from Moscow is not clear. Unnamed
"high Soviet sources'' told Western correspondents after the war that although
Moscow backed the Egyptian concentration of forces in Sinai, it definitely
did not approve the blockade. Whether the Russians agreed to demands for
the withdrawal of UNEF is uncertain. Once Nasser reinstated the blockade,
the Russians reportedly warned him that the Soviet Union would commit itself
only to neutralizing possible United States intervention, and that the
degree of Soviet involvement would not be escalated beyond the level of
American action.
Nasser stated, on May 29, that Defense Minister Badran, who had just
returned from Moscow, brought a message from Premier Kosygin that "the
Soviet Union stands with us in this battle and will not allow any country to
intervene, so that the state of affairs prevailing before 1956 may be restored."
(In subsequent speeches Nasser declared that the Arabs ultimate objective
remained restoration of the pre-1948 situation, i.e., the destruction of the
State of Israel.)
With the Soviet Union ready to check any direct American intervention,