1968_4_arabisraelwar

174 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1 9 6 8
capitals. McCloskey replied: "We have tried to steer an even-handed course
through this. Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed."
The statement caused consternation among members of Congress and the
press, who interpreted it as complete American indifference to what was
happening. Many saw it as a sign that the United States was prepared to
abandon Israel to its fate—and to those believing Cairo reports that fate
appeared grim indeed, with Arab armies allegedly advancing on all fronts
and Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem under massive air attacks. Concerned
over the impression created by McCloskey that the U.S. was selling out Israel,
Johnson called in Rusk, who proceeded to explain to the newsmen that
the United States was a "nonbelligerent," and that the "use of this word
neutral—which is a great concept of international law—is not an expression
of indifference, and indeed indifference is not permitted to us."
Rusk's clarification failed to satisfy some Senators, among them Dirksen,
Javits, Hugh Scott (Rep., Pa.) and Joseph S. Clark (Dem., Pa.). Clark declared
that "morally, as well as legally, we are an ally of Israel. We are not
neutral." Yet, despite the widespread sympathy for Israel on the first day
of the war, no Senate leader suggested that the United States take military
action to back Israel. The prevailing sentiment on June 5 was forcefully
stated by Senator Richard D. Russell (Dem., Ga.), chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, who told reporters that he was "unalterably opposed to
any unilateral intervention" in the Middle East. Senator Mansfield indicated
that there might have been more sentiment to help Israel, if not for "the
situation in Vietnam." The Administration and the Senate, he said, had both
"kept their cool" in the crisis.
While McCloskey's remarks may have seemed callous at the time, a clear
statement of American neutrality probably was the best support for Israel
under the circumstances. By the time McCloskey spoke to the reporters,
it was evening in the Middle East and the White House had confirmed intelligence
reports that the Israel air force had virtually wiped out the Egyptian,
Syrian, and Jordanian air forces and now had complete command of the
skies. There was no longer any threat to Israel's population centers and therefore
no need for American intervention.
Soviet Reaction
The only danger to Israel was from direct Soviet intervention. A firm
posture of American nonbelligerence was thus useful to counteract the charges
of American air support for Israel, which the Arabs propagated to draw in
the Russians. When the story continued to be repeated despite Defense Department
and State Department protests, Secretary Rusk went before the
television cameras, June 6, and angrily and categorically denied the charge,
which soon proved to have been invented by Nasser and Hussein in a radiotelephone
conversation. According to the account in The Six Day War by
Randolph S. and Winston S. Churchill, the Russians were also angered by