1968_4_arabisraelwar
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UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 149<br />
financing some development projects already under way. Soon thereafter<br />
Washington also resumed its annual $27 million support of the Jordanian<br />
budget. Some Congressmen, Representative Edward J. Gurney (Rep., Fla.)<br />
among them, opposed resumption of aid before Hussein agreed to make peace<br />
with Israel, broke with Nasser, and promised to reject offers of Soviet military<br />
aid made during his visit to Moscow in October. However, the administration<br />
believed the carrot to be more effective than the stick, and underscored<br />
Washington's desire for warm and close relations with Jordan during<br />
Hussein's visit in November. Officials cited the allegedly more moderate and<br />
conciliatory tone of Hussein's remarks about Israel as evidence that Jordan<br />
shared the United States' own deep concern for peace and stability in the<br />
region. Hussein reportedly agreed to maintain his pro-Western stance, and<br />
rejected Soviet offers of military aid.<br />
United States Role in the Middle East Arms Race<br />
In 1967 the administration encountered growing congressional opposition<br />
to supplying military equipment to underdeveloped countries that were likely<br />
to use them not to resist Communist aggression, but to fight their neighbors.<br />
The June war found American weapons used on both sides: the Jordanian<br />
army used United States-supplied Patton tanks and artillery in its June 5<br />
attack on Israeli cities and settlements, and, when Hussein had failed to heed<br />
Israeli appeals to stay out of the war, the Israeli army also used American<br />
tanks in their counter-attack.<br />
In July Representative Lester L. Wolff (Dem., N.Y.) revealed that among<br />
the Arab officers the United States was continuing to train, were 12 Sudanese,<br />
8 Iraqis, and one Syrian, whose countries had broken diplomatic relations with<br />
the United States. In view of these countries' close ties with the Soviet Union,<br />
he regarded this as "a flagrant violation of our national security." Protests<br />
by the House Armed Services Committee and by such prominent senators as<br />
Karl E. Mundt (Rep., S. Dak.), moved the Pentagon in August to suspend<br />
training of such officers. The Sudanese and Iraqis were allowed to complete<br />
their courses to prevent "undue hardship. 1 ' The Defense Department stated<br />
that most of the approximately 500 Arab officers to be trained in the United<br />
States during the 1967-68 fiscal year would come from Libya and Saudi<br />
Arabia, where the United States had military installations and oil interests;<br />
the others from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. The training program<br />
was intended "to encourage and strengthen these moderate Arab states,"<br />
to provide "a useful offset to Soviet influence in the Arab military establishments,"<br />
and to expose future Arab military leaders, having "a key role" in<br />
many Arab states, to "United States military doctrine and to the democratic<br />
way of life in the United States." Sixty-one Israeli officers were being trained<br />
under the program.<br />
Legal obstacles imposed by Congress and opposition in principle prevented