1968_4_arabisraelwar
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 169<br />
1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 208-13): On February 11, 1957, John Foster Dulles,<br />
the then Secretary of State, had handed Ambassador Eban a memorandum<br />
expressing the U.S. view that the Gulf of Aqaba "comprehends international<br />
waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage<br />
in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto," and pledging that<br />
"the United States is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage<br />
and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right." On<br />
February 20, 1957 President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared, "if, unhappily,<br />
Egypt does hereafter violate" its obligation to allow Israel shipping to use the<br />
Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba "then this should be dealt with firmly by<br />
the society of nations." UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold had made<br />
it clear in January that any Egyptian resumption of a blockade was contrary<br />
to earlier Security Council decisions, according to which "none of the parties<br />
to the 1949 Armistice Agreement is entitled to claim belligerent rights, including<br />
the application of such rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of<br />
Tiran." During the 1957 UN discussion many of the major maritime powers<br />
made similar statements, supporting freedom of navigation through the Strait<br />
of Tiran to Israel's port of Eilat. The legal principle involved was incorporated<br />
in Article 16 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea<br />
and the Contiguous Zone.<br />
Ambassador Goldberg noted in the Security Council, on May 29, 1967,<br />
that both the Soviet Union and the United States were parties to this convention,<br />
codifying basic international law. Consequently, he said, the Egyptian<br />
attempt to reimpose the blockade jeopardized not only the rights of<br />
Israel "but also the rights of all trading nations under international law."<br />
U.S. Hesitates to Break Blockade<br />
When the 1967 crisis erupted there was thus widespread support both in<br />
the United States and among the Western maritime powers for the legal correctness<br />
of Israel's position and sympathy for its demand of free passage.<br />
However, when it came to translate this moral support into effective international<br />
action to make Nasser give up the blockade, all the pledges and<br />
assurances quickly melted away. Former President Eisenhower reportedly<br />
replied to a query from the White House that the United States was bound<br />
by a "commitment of honor" to keep the Strait open. In a press conference<br />
on May 25, he reaffirmed the U.S. duty to maintain the right of passage for<br />
American ships, but weakened the statement by adding that it was a UN<br />
problem rather than a strictly American matter. He cautioned that "none<br />
of us should hurry to become involved."<br />
Similar hesitation marked the response of the administration and Congressional<br />
leaders of both parties. While the President's clearest legal mandate<br />
was to use United States flag ships in a direct unilateral challenge of the<br />
blockade, political sentiment was strongly opposed to the U.S. going it alone.<br />
Senators Harrison A. Williams (Dem., N.J.) and Wayne Morse (Dem.,