1968_4_arabisraelwar

180 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1968
cept the new draft urged upon them by Gromyko. The Arabs were not prepared
to concede Israel's right to exist as the price for Israeli withdrawal.
However, the episode was to have one positive result: it demonstrated to
Moscow that Washington did not intend to humiliate it and score a propaganda
victory, but would support any constructive moves to achieve a just
peace settlement in the Middle East.
On July 21 the Assembly adjourned "temporarily," after adopting by a
vote of 63 to 26, with 27 abstentions, a resolution requesting the Secretary
General to forward the records of the emergency session to the Security
Council "to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter of urgency,
of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East." The Soviet
Union and the other Eastern European states, except Albania, joined the
United States and most Latin American and West European states in supporting
the resolution, the Arab states voted against it, and Israel abstained.
On September 18, the day before the opening of the regular fall session of
the General Assembly, it met once more in emergency session and unanimously
urged the Assembly to give "high priority" to the Middle East crisis.
But while the situation in the Middle East figured prominently in the opening
speeches of many UN delegates, the Assembly dealt only with the refugee
question (p. 184) and left the overall political issues to the Security Council.
Meanwhile, the Arab states had met in a summit conference at Khartoum
at the end of August and, while reiterating their refusal to recognize Israel
or to negotiate with it, left the door open to UN efforts for an acceptable
political settlement. However, Syria and Algeria demanded that military action
against Israel be continued.
Security Council
Resolution
When the Council resumed discussion in November, after informal behindthe-scenes
meetings, there appeared considerable movement toward a consensus.
A resolution introduced by India, Nigeria, and Mali, and one subsequently
introduced by the Soviet Union acknowledged the need to end the
state of belligerency and to allow innocent passage through international
waterways. But whereas these resolutions were very specific in laying down
the terms for complete Israeli withdrawal and rather vague about the rights
and guarantees the Arabs should offer Israel in return, a resolution offered
by the United States was vague about the details of withdrawal and clear
about the other elements to be included in the peace settlement.
However, all agreed on the desirability of appointing a special UN envoy
who would use quiet diplomacy in trying to find a way out of the impasse.
The problem was agreement on the principles that should guide him and the
scope of his mandate. Here the British stepped in and, making good use of
their centuries of diplomatic experience, succeeded in drafting a resolution
that was sufficiently clear in principle and vague in detail to permit each side
to interpret it as supporting its own position.