1968_4_arabisraelwar

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS / 187
contribution, amounting to about 65 per cent of total governmental pledges,
was "still entirely too high for a multilateral program." The Soviet Union and
other Communist countries, except for Yugoslavia, never contributed to
UNRWA. After the resolution was adopted by the Assembly plenary by a
vote of 98 to 0, Fountain pointedly noted that "the affirmative votes included
those of the Arab States and of the socialist countries. 1 '
However, the Soviet Union still has made no contribution. In his speech
to the Special Political Committee, on December 14, Soviet delegate Leonid
N. Kutakov evaded the issue, stressing instead Moscow's direct assistance to
the Arab states, and pledging continued Soviet support "in their struggle for
their rights and for the liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression."
This demonstrated yet another of the ironies emerging from the 1967
Middle East crisis. Nasser and other self-styled revolutionary Arab leaders
have long criticized the United States for allegedly using its aid as a means
of influencing Arab policies, while lauding the Soviet Union for its magnanimity
in providing aid without any strings attached. Yet, in 1967, it was
Washington which was most eager to avoid any unilateral involvement and
sought cooperative international action in both the political and economic
fields through the multilateral channels of the United Nations. The Soviet
Union utilized the UN only where it could be used to advance Soviet interests,
as a propaganda forum and as a means for putting pressure on Israel
to withdraw. It chose to continue its traditional pattern of providing only
unilateral military and economic assistance directly to selected Arab countries,
and left to others the task of meeting the humanitarian needs of the
refugees.
While no Arab state wished to become a puppet of either superpower, at
the end of 1967 some observers in the Arab world were beginning to question
whether the Soviet Union was really altruistic, and whether Soviet aid
did not in fact carry with it potential chains far heavier than the strings
allegedly attached to American assistance.
GEORGE E. GRUEN