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asia policy
In response, President Obama “explained that he hopes to convey to
Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan that the U.S.-Japan alliance
is solid and the United States security commitment to Japan including its
extended deterrence is unshakable.” 7
Obtaining such explicit assurances from the United States is necessary
not only for policy reasons but also for political reasons. With the
increasing evidence that North Korea has been mastering technologies
needed for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the development
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assess that
Pyongyang is acquiring second-strike nuclear capabilities. Given that this
could undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, it is imperative
to demonstrate that the United States’ resolve to defend Japan from
North Korea’s threats remains as strong as ever. Politically, these explicit
assurances are important to calm a Japanese public that tends to be skeptical
of the reliability of U.S. defense commitments. These factors explain why
Japan swiftly expressed its opposition to the Obama administration’s idea
of declaring “no first use” of nuclear weapons. 8 Japan also opposed the UN
resolution on October 27 calling for the initiation of negotiations on a treaty
banning nuclear weapons, despite sharp criticism from a domestic audience
with strong anti-nuclear sentiments. That Japan did not merely abstain
from voting reflects the Abe administration’s determination to maintain an
effective U.S. nuclear umbrella. 9
However, the surprising result of the 2016 U.S. presidential election
rattled Japan’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Within both the
Japanese government and the Japanese public, the concern has risen that
Donald Trump may act on the disturbing rhetoric of his presidential
campaign—that South Korea and Japan should defend themselves by
developing their own nuclear weapons if necessary, or that he would
welcome a sit-down with Kim Jong-un. 10 The damage is already done; in a
public opinion survey conducted after the election, 58% of those surveyed
7 “Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), September 9, 2016 u
http://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000519.html.
8 Naoya Yoshino, “Bei no kaku sensei fushiyo kento, Nihon hukumu domeikoku hantai” [The United
States Considers No-First-Use Policy of Nuclear Weapons, Allies Including Japan Disagree], Nikkei,
August 17, 2016.
9 “Kakukinshi kosho ketsugi: Nihon hantai ‘Anpo yusen’ ” [Conclusion of Nuclear Weapons Ban
Negotiations: Japan Disagrees “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Should Be Priority”], Mainichi Shimbun,
October 28, 2016 u http://mainichi.jp/articles/20161029/k00/00m/030/156000c.
10 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Donald Trump Open to Japan and South Korea Having
Nuclear Weapons,” Financial Times, March 26, 2016 u https://www.ft.com/content/
c927017c-f398-11e5-9afe-dd2472ea263d.
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