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asia policy In response, President Obama “explained that he hopes to convey to Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan that the U.S.-Japan alliance is solid and the United States security commitment to Japan including its extended deterrence is unshakable.” 7 Obtaining such explicit assurances from the United States is necessary not only for policy reasons but also for political reasons. With the increasing evidence that North Korea has been mastering technologies needed for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assess that Pyongyang is acquiring second-strike nuclear capabilities. Given that this could undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, it is imperative to demonstrate that the United States’ resolve to defend Japan from North Korea’s threats remains as strong as ever. Politically, these explicit assurances are important to calm a Japanese public that tends to be skeptical of the reliability of U.S. defense commitments. These factors explain why Japan swiftly expressed its opposition to the Obama administration’s idea of declaring “no first use” of nuclear weapons. 8 Japan also opposed the UN resolution on October 27 calling for the initiation of negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons, despite sharp criticism from a domestic audience with strong anti-nuclear sentiments. That Japan did not merely abstain from voting reflects the Abe administration’s determination to maintain an effective U.S. nuclear umbrella. 9 However, the surprising result of the 2016 U.S. presidential election rattled Japan’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Within both the Japanese government and the Japanese public, the concern has risen that Donald Trump may act on the disturbing rhetoric of his presidential campaign—that South Korea and Japan should defend themselves by developing their own nuclear weapons if necessary, or that he would welcome a sit-down with Kim Jong-un. 10 The damage is already done; in a public opinion survey conducted after the election, 58% of those surveyed 7 “Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), September 9, 2016 u http://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000519.html. 8 Naoya Yoshino, “Bei no kaku sensei fushiyo kento, Nihon hukumu domeikoku hantai” [The United States Considers No-First-Use Policy of Nuclear Weapons, Allies Including Japan Disagree], Nikkei, August 17, 2016. 9 “Kakukinshi kosho ketsugi: Nihon hantai ‘Anpo yusen’ ” [Conclusion of Nuclear Weapons Ban Negotiations: Japan Disagrees “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Should Be Priority”], Mainichi Shimbun, October 28, 2016 u http://mainichi.jp/articles/20161029/k00/00m/030/156000c. 10 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Donald Trump Open to Japan and South Korea Having Nuclear Weapons,” Financial Times, March 26, 2016 u https://www.ft.com/content/ c927017c-f398-11e5-9afe-dd2472ea263d. [ 92 ]
oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat said that their worries about U.S.-Japan relations under President Trump outweigh their positive expectations. 11 If the new U.S. administration pursues the policies that Trump promoted during his campaign, the voices within Japan calling for acquiring independent capabilities to conduct surgical airstrikes against targets in North Korea or even nuclear weapons may become louder. Enhancing Security Cooperation with South Korea South Korea has been an obstacle to effective trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea due to the strained relations between Seoul and Tokyo since the beginning of the presidency of Park Geun-hye. However, thanks partly to the agreement on the “comfort women” issue reached in December 2015 and partly to the worsening relations between China and South Korea, security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo has been steadily improving. 12 After North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Park agreed to work together to influence the international community to take a firm response to North Korea. 13 Since then, Abe and Park have conducted summit meetings twice in 2016, promising close cooperation concerning North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. As for bilateral military cooperation, Japan has supported the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea since the South Korean–U.S. negotiations on the subject began, and Tokyo welcomed Seoul’s decision to deploy the missile defense system in July 2016. 14 Japan also began to explore whether South Korea might be willing to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The two states almost signed the agreement four years ago, but South Korea declined to do so at the last minute due to 11 “Kongo no Nichibei kankei ni fuan 58%” [58% of Japanese People Worried about Future U.S.-Japan Relationship], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 14, 2016. 12 For more detailed analysis of bilateral cooperation in 2016, see Scott A. Snyder and Brad Glosserman, “Japan–South Korean Relations in 2016: A Return to the Old Normal,” Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, September 23, 2016 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/09/23/ japan-south-korea-relations-in-2016-a-return-to-the-old-normal. 13 “U.S. to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense System in South Korea,” Japan Times, July 8, 2016 u http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/asia-pacific/u-s-deploy-thaad-missile-defensesouth-korea-china-slams-decision/#.WCmE14VOJjo. 14 “Kitachosen no kaku to Chugoku no kyohaku ga Kanbeinichi no anzenhosho no kessoku wo kyokasaseta” [North Korea Nuclear Issues and China Threat Enforce Bond between United States and Japan], Dong-a Ilbo, September 20, 2016; and Hyo-Ju Son, “Korea, Japan Expected to Sign GSOMIA This Month,” Dong-a Ilbo, November 9, 2016 u http://english.donga.com/3/ all/26/777523/1. [ 93 ]
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the national bureau of asian resear
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asia policy number 23 • january 2
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u articles and essays u japan’s c
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