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asia policy
definitively address the North Korean nuclear problem from one perspective
may require sacrificing a priority built into other perspectives.
A Threat to Successful Deterrence
Especially in defense circles, the highest priority for U.S. and regional
interests has long been maintaining stability through deterrence. When
deterrence-based stability is the overriding priority, barring a diplomatic
miracle, the United States must effectively plan to live with a nuclear-armed
North Korea. Diplomacy can help bolster deterrence but never undermine
it. International sanctions are a peripheral concern. Preventive strikes on
nuclear facilities are possible, but only if policymakers truly believe doing so
would have a future deterrence benefit, which is debatable. A stability-first
strategy toward North Korea involves preventing war through deterrence
and getting a better grip on the provocation problem.
First, deterrence of major war is a constant work in progress, not
something to be taken for granted simply because the United States is
the bigger power. Deterrence depends on a dynamic formula involving
capabilities, interest, and resolve—what it takes to deter invasion or military
adventurism changes depending on what North Korea does and has. North
Korea tinkering with the size and composition of its military arsenal should
compel the United States to frequently revisit contingency planning, force
presence, and strategic signaling considerations.
Second, whereas strategic deterrence has held on the Korean Peninsula
for more than a half-century, tactical deterrence has repeatedly failed.
North Korea has a long history of resorting to small-scale, isolated acts of
militarized violence (“provocations”) against the United States and South
Korea. U.S. policymakers have historically viewed these provocations
as undesirable but basically acceptable as long as war did not break out
anew. 1 But provocations are becoming a newly unacceptable problem
because of pressures from Seoul. Since 2010, when North Korea twice
attacked the South, the latter vowed “manifold retaliation” against North
Korea the next time it engaged in violent provocations, and South Korea
has been adjusting its military capabilities, doctrine, and force posture to
make good on that threat. 2 In the wake of the 2010 attacks, South Korean
public discourse has also increasingly favored developing an independent
1 Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S.–North Korea Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
2 Ibid., 185.
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