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the 3-3-2 formula: three CCG ships enter the Japanese waters three times
a month for up to two hours during each visit. 49 Each time, the JCG sends
a message in Chinese and Japanese to the ships to leave the waters, and
the CCG replies that these are Chinese waters and that the vessels have the
right to pass through. The ships stay approximately two hours and leave the
territorial waters to continue sailing around the islands for approximately
ten hours.
The ships deployed by the CCG are usually between 1,000 and 3,000 tons,
including refurbished People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels above 2,000 tons.
Its large 10,000-ton ships have not been deployed so far to the area around
the Senkakus. In case of an incident, the two sides have established a hotline
between their headquarters, but it has not been used so far. While the CCG
ships do not respect a secure distance between boats and zigzag, which
renders navigation more hazardous, they do seem to be careful not to escalate
the situation, according to the JCG.
Even though the situation seems to be under control, it remains quite
tense, and many fear contingencies involving hybrid warfare, such as an
attempt by an armed group disguised as fishermen to take control of a remote
Japanese island. This kind of scenario would require optimal coordination
between the JCG and JMSDF.
The Growing Coordination between the JCG and JMSDF
As explained earlier, there is not a history or culture of close
cooperation and coordination between the JCG and JMSDF. However, this
situation has improved step by step, especially after the two cases of North
Korean spy ships entering Japan’s territorial waters in 1999 and 2001. In
the March 1999 incident, the government requested that the JMSDF chase
the spy vessels because of their high speed instead of the JCG, which was
originally in charge of the mission and initially preferred for the job by the
government. 50 Following this case, the JCG Law was revised to allow more
extensive rules of engagement. In December 2001 the JCG was ordered
to give chase to a suspicious North Korean ship. Following an exchange
49 Interview with a JCG official, Ishigaki, July 2016; and Yoichi Funabashi, “A Coast Guard–Maintained
Peace in the East China Sea,” Japan Times, April 19, 2016. This routine evolved after the exceptionally
large deployment of Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships around the Senkaku Islands in
August 2016. Since then, the CCG’s routine seems to have changed to a 4-3-2 formula: four ships have
been spotted three times a month in Japan’s territorial waters, lingering for up to two hours. Author’s
interviews with several Japanese officials, December 2016.
50 Lindsay Black, Japan’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 104.
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